Imidugudu, Villagisation in Rwanda; A Case of Emergency Development? by Hilhorst, D. & Leeuwen, M. van
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/157265
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-05 and may be subject to
change.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dorothea Hilhorst 
Mathijs van Leeuwen 
 
 
Imidugudu, Villagisation in Rwanda 
A Case of Emergency Development? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disaster Sites, no 2, 1999 
Wageningen Disaster Studies
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wageningen Disaster Studies, 1999 
 
ISBN   90 76657 02 5 
 
  
 
Contents 
1. Introduction: returning refugees in Rwanda 5 
Issues of returning refugees 7 
Background of the housing problem in Rwanda 8 
2. The Imidugudu policy: coming into being of a masterplan 11 
Imidugudu in the line of earlier policies for housing and land use 12 
Land scarcity or land myth: competing narratives 13 
3. Imidugudu as a widely supported controversy 15 
Questions and considerations 16 
Appropriateness 16 
Politics of Imidugudu 17 
Implementation 19 
Affections and aversions 20 
Institutional interfaces, mandates and interests 22 
The Rwanda government and the international organisations 22 
Agency interests and mandates 23 
Funding and other economic interests 24 
Concluding 25 
4. Imidugudu in practice 26 
The case of Kanzenze 27 
Imidugudu actors: local government and NGOs 27 
Beneficiaries of the settlements 28 
Building and occupying the sites 29 
Services and livelihood 30 
Land distribution and use 30 
The issue of cattle 32 
Beneficiaries as strategizing actors 32 
Imidugudu entering a new phase 34 
Concluding 35 
The case of Gisenyi 36 
Imidugudu actors: local government and NGOs 37 
Beneficiaries and selection 38 
Building and occupying the sites 38 
Services and livelihoods 39 
Land distribution and use 40 
The issue of cattle 41 
Beneficiaries as strategizing actors 42 
Concluding 44 
5. Conclusion 45 
 References 48 
 
  
 
Imidugudu, villagisation in Rwanda
A case of emergency development? ∗  
 
 
As a response to the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees after the 
war and genocide in 1994, the new Rwanda government launched a 
settlement programme, Imidugudu. Since early 1997, this programme 
targets the entire rural population, that has to be regrouped in villages. 
The settlement programme is implemented with support from international 
agencies, including UNHCR and numerous NGOs.  
The first part of this paper reviews the considerations of the agencies 
supporting the programme. From the start, ambiguities concerning the 
aims and appropriateness of the policy and the performance and 
feasibility of implementation made the programme controversial. Agencies 
nonetheless supported the policy, hoping it would adequately address the 
shelter crisis and contribute to a solution of some of Rwanda’s pressing 
development problems. 
The second part of the paper considers local processes of implementation. 
Two case studies look into the perceptions and practices of the actors 
involved, including the local population, regional authorities, and 
implementing NGOs. The studies make clear that Imidugudu contributes 
to the resolution of a major housing problem. However, little as yet has 
been achieved to address settlement, land, agriculture, and other 
economic activities in an integrated way, as the policy had envisaged.  
The case of Imidugudu brings out dilemmas of ‘emergency development’. 
Faced with a shelter emergency in Rwanda, agencies accepted a blue 
print policy for development. Given the variety in local conditions, and the 
differential actors’ responses, a case-to-case approach would better suit 
the rural development needs of the country. 
 
 
1. Introduction: Returning Refugees in Rwanda 
 
In the aftermath of the 1990–1994 war, the tiny central African country of Rwanda 
had to rebuild itself from the destruction, both human and material, caused by the 
genocide and the war. It also faced the return of an estimated 2.5 million refugees 
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in a four year period. The reintegration of these returnees is seen as a prerequisite 
for reconciliation and development and is therefore a priority for the government 
as well as the international community. A cornerstone of the reintegration is 
formed by a programme to create villages where returnees and the on-staying 
population without accommodation are provided with housing and services. This 
ambitious programme, by the name of Imidugudu,1 aims eventually to regroup the 
entire rural population of the country in villages. By the end of 1998, four years 
after the war, construction had started in around 250 communities. An estimated 
85,000 houses were completed, with the assistance of United Nations organisations 
and international NGOs and numerous more houses with local means only. From 
an emergency situation a far stretching development programme was born. 
This paper is about the Rwanda Imidugudu programme. The first two 
chapters describe how the policy evolved. It was a response to the large population 
influx into the country, and was in accordance with the Arusha agreements of 
1993. It meant to solve an existing development problem, namely of the increasing 
people/land ratio, a dwindling agricultural sector and few urban settlements that 
could absorb the surplus population from the rural areas. From its inception, 
Imidugudu has been controversial. While on the one hand the policy received 
substantial support, there were also organisations that did not want to get involved 
in the village programme. They questioned the aims and appropriateness of the 
policy, criticised its implementation, and pointed to the disappointing experiences 
with village formation programmes in other African countries, such as Tanzania, 
Ethiopia and Mozambique.  
Nonetheless, Imidugudu has become a hinge to enrol the continuing 
support of the UNHCR and a large number of other international NGOs. Village 
formation, or more specifically, supporting the construction of houses, has become 
a major activity of many of these organisations. The third chapter of the paper 
reviews the considerations of the agencies supporting the programme and discusses 
the ambiguities that came into being. It will explore the meaning ascribed to the 
programme, the needs the policy is meant to address and the stakes involved for 
the assisting organisations. One factor that stands out is how support evolved from 
the immediate needs of the country in an emergency situation. As we will 
conclude, the experiences with Imidugudu give rise to some caution on how to 
integrate relief and development in post-conflict situations.  
The fourth chapter of this paper asks how Imidugudu was implemented at 
the local level. One of the fascinating aspects of the Imidugudu policy is that it has 
evolved into a multimillion-dollar programme, in the midst of vagueness. After the 
presentation of the policy, rumours started to circulate in Kigali about its aims and 
possible implications. Some of this initial confusion has remained, because the 
instructions that were issued to implement the policy were never ratified in 
parliament, leaving ambiguity about its pace and scope. Monitoring and evaluation 
have lagged far behind implementation and with the fast pace of settlement 
building over the last few years, even the most basic statistics of the aggregated 
costs and achievements are unavailable. The research informing this paper has 
been one of the ongoing attempts to gain insight into the local processes of 
                                                 
1
  The term Imidugudu refers to the villages under the programme; the singular Umudugudu refers 
to one village. 
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implementation.2 It looks at the question how the programme gets shaped locally 
in the interplay of three sets of actors: the local government, implementing NGOs 
and the local population. 
The case of Imidugudu contributes to present discussions about repatriating 
refugees and development. As the following section will elaborate, issues 
pertaining to repatriation have only recently gained importance in policy and 
academic circles. The complexities involved in the Rwanda case may highlight 
some of these issues. One of the central questions is how emergency situations 
may be responded to in such a way as to enhance long term development. 
Imidugudu may be viewed as probably one of the most daring experiments taking 
up this challenge.  
 
 
Issues of returning refugees 
 
In 1985, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) was given 
the affirmation that it had a legitimate interest in the return of refugees. This 
reflected a change in donor policies towards repatriation. Until that time, issues of 
repatriation had received little attention. Some refugee situations were too delicate 
in the cold-war days to consider repatriation. In other cases, repatriation was, apart 
from some logistics, considered a natural and unproblematic move, following the 
successful resolution of conflict and the restoration of peace in the home area of 
the refugees flow (Rogge, 1994:22). Implicitly, it was assumed that both refugees 
and the home situation were untouched by the period of exile and that life could 
resume as before the disturbance that caused the flight.  
 It was not until the 1980s that the problematic nature of repatriation became 
a matter of concern. It was realised that repatriation often took place under far from 
ideal conditions. At the end of colonialism, refugees fled their countries mostly in the 
context of anti-colonial wars, after which they were able to return home safely. In 
later times, it were mostly political repression, internal violence, collapse of instituti-
ons and extreme poverty which led people to flee.3 As those problems were of a 
protracted nature, exoduses tended to become permanent (Rogge, 1994:18). When 
people returned, it was often to a situation of instability. According to Stein,  
“today, most voluntary repatriations occur under conflict, without a 
decisive political event such as national independence, without any change 
in the regime or in the condition which caused the flight” (Stein, 1994:52).  
 Sometimes, returns were not voluntary at all: in some cases the conditions in 
the host country, political upheavals spreading over from the home country (Allen 
and Turton, 1996:2) or lack of assistance made refugees decide to return.  
 While the complexities involved in repatriation became clear, repatriation as 
such moved higher on the agenda of the international community. Increasing refugee 
                                                 
2
  Although some major evaluations have been done on the international interventions in the Great 
Lakes Region (see a.o. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996; Lautze, 
Jones and Duffield, 1998), these focus on the crisis and emergency relief. Relatively little 
attention has been given to the rehabilitation and development following the war. 
3
  However, Terence Ranger (1996) argues that it is misleading to identify types of refugee-returnee 
situations with a distinction between colonial and post-colonial regimes as both types of repatriation 
occured during colonialism as well as in present times.  
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flows resulted in increasing frictions in host countries and costs for refugee 
programmes grew. With the Cold War coming to an end, some of the political 
obstacles to repatriation were removed, giving another impetus to policies geared 
towards repatriation. At the same time, it became recognised that returned groups 
needed to get their livelihoods ensured, and this has become a matter of concern of 
refugee programmes, such as those of the UNHCR (Allen and Turton, 1996:3).  
  As we shall see, the Rwanda case exemplifies the intricacies involved in 
repatriation. The returnees did not find a peaceful haven to return to, but a 
politically, socially and economically extremely volatile situation. The magnitude 
of the number of returnees only added to the problems. Moreover, the implicit 
notion that refugees remain untouched by their experiences in exile obviously did 
not hold for the Rwanda returnees. Liisa Malkki showed how social experiences of 
refugees from Burundi in Tanzania produced categories of identity as Hutu and Tutsi. 
She found that refugees living in towns, dispersed among the host population, and 
refugees living in camps ascribed radically different meanings to national identity and 
history, home and homeland and the experience of exile (Malkki, 1995). The invasion 
of Rwanda in 1990, by forces mainly recruited from Tutsi refugees living in camps in 
Uganda since 1959, suggests the importance of Malkki’s findings to understand the 
dynamics of present day Rwanda. 
 
 
Background of the housing problem in Rwanda 
 
Since July 1994, between 2.3 and 2.6 million people have moved back into 
Rwanda, of which 1.3 million in 1996 only (UNHCR, 1998). These returnees 
consisted of different groups. An important distinction was made between what 
was called, in the military-style parlance of emergency operations, the ‘Old Case 
Load’ and the ‘New Case Load’. The ‘New Case Load’ consisted of those people 
who had fled the country as a result of the 1990-1994 war and immediately after 
the genocide. The ‘Old Case Load’ consisted of people who had spent many years 
in exile before they came back. The distinction is important for a number of 
reasons: their histories, experiences in exile, the ethnic composition of the two 
‘Loads’,4 and their relative proximity to central state power. To get the picture 
clear, we need to go back in the country’s history. 
 One of the legacies of the colonial period in Rwanda has been a deep-
seated antagonism between the two main ethnic groups of the country: the Hutu 
and the Tutsi.5 Recent studies have come to understand colonial history as a period 
in which the dynamic relations between these two groups became frozen into a 
situation where the colonisers relied on the Tutsi minority to rule the Hutu 
majority. They coated this arrangement in dubious myths of ‘racial superiority’ and 
a ‘traditional domination’ of the Tutsi over the Hutu. By the end of the colonial 
period, the social fabric of society had come to reflect quite accurately the colonial 
style of ruling and its underlying myths (Prunier, 1997/1995:1-4; Malkki, 1995; 
Reyntjens, 1994). 
                                                 
4
  From here on, we shall avoid the term Case Load, and instead refer to Old and New Case 
refugees, returnees and repatriates. 
5
 Apart from these two groups, there is the minority ethnic group of the Twa, comprising about 1% 
of the population. Their role in the history and present politics is not included in this paper. 
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 This became clear during the de-colonisation process from 1959 to 1964. 
During the chaotic process of ‘democratisation’, the Hutu take over of the 
government and the abolishment of the central Tutsi monarchy, more than 300,000 
Tutsi fled the country, mainly to Uganda and Burundi. Several rounds of recurring 
violence, mainly against the Tutsi minority, produced additional refugees, 
including one other massive outflow of Tutsi in 1973. Negotiations in the 1980s 
for the repatriation of these refugees did not succeed, leading in the early 1990s to 
guerrilla intrusions in Rwanda by the Rwandese Patriotic front (the RPF) made up 
of Tutsi residing in Uganda. Efforts to end the civil war resulted in the 1993 
Arusha Agreement.  The agreement did not succeed in bringing the designed 
peace, but was to play a role later in the post-war dealing with issues of land and 
housing.  
 On April 6 1994, a mortar attack on the aeroplane carrying President 
Habyarimana meant the abrupt beginning of a brutal genocide meant to kill all the 
Tutsi as well as the Hutu political opposition. The main perpetrators of the 
genocide were the Interahamwe, a civilian militia affiliated with Habyarimana’s 
single party, the MRND(D) (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le 
Développement et la Démocratie). The genocide raged over the country, took the 
lives of an estimated 800,000 people,6 maybe even reaching to one million, and 
destroyed countless properties. In the meantime, the RPF intensified its offensive 
and was able to take over control in Kigali in July 1994. During the war and 
immediately after the genocide, two million people crossed the border, mainly to 
Zaire and Tanzania. These were mainly comprised of the Hutu population, both 
engaged in and innocent to the genocide, seeking refuge for expected retaliation by 
the RPF. They were to form the New Case refugees. 
 While the large flows of New Case refugees were still crossing the borders 
to neighbouring countries, an estimated 800,000 people started moving in the 
opposite direction, repatriating into the country following the RPF. These were the 
Tutsi in exile, many of whom had been living for as much as 30 years in Uganda, 
Burundi or Zaire. This influx is what relief agencies referred to as the ‘Old Case 
Load’. They were not a homogeneous group. Distinctions in the country of exile 
accounted for major differences among them, and their socio-economic status was 
quite diverse. Those taking part in the Kigali government have come to symbolise 
this group to the extent that one easily forgets that in majority they were poor 
country dwellers that were to survive of cultivation. 
 Despite the massive destruction of the war and genocide, housing was 
originally no major problem. The Old Case repatriates and the genocide survivors 
whose houses were destroyed could start to live in houses and work the fields 
vacated by the New Case refugees. However, gradually most of the Hutu refugees 
came back to Rwanda. In the first two years after the war, half a million New Case 
refugees returned. Then, by the end of 1996, a sudden massive return of an 
estimated 720,000 people from Zaire occurred. They came as a result of the attacks 
on the refugee camps by joint forces of Laurent Kabila’s ADFL, Zairian 
Banyamulenge groups and Rwanda’s army. The new Rwanda government was 
keen on dismantling the camps, that had become centres to regroup the Hutu 
Interahamwe and from where small-scale border attacks were launched. The 
                                                 
6
  Estimates vary between 500,000 and 1,000,000, but the number of 800,000 is generally accepted. 
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resulting influx of New Case repatriates created a huge problem of shelter. This 
was exacerbated by the return of another 480,000 returnees from Tanzania in early 
1997.  
 The new Government had promised to respect the entitlements to property 
abandoned by the New Case refugees. This meant that the repatriating New Case 
repatriates could reclaim their houses and fields from the Old Case repatriates that 
temporarily occupied them, rendering these people homeless. Other New Case 
repatriates stayed homeless because they found their houses destroyed or were not 
able to reclaim them from their new occupants. In some places sharing 
arrangements were made between Old Case repatriates and New Case returnees. A 
huge number of people, however, ended up living under plastic sheeting provided 
by relief agencies. In 1997, estimates of the number of families in immediate need 
of housing ranged from 250,000 to 300,000.  
The Imidugudu policy was a response to this immediate need for housing. 
It was a relief programme, that sprang from an emergency situation. On the other 
hand, it had the ambition of a long-term development programme, meant to 
address the entire population and evolved from earlier development planning 
practices in the country. Although its focus was on accommodation, it implied a 
conversion of land use planning and agricultural production, and carried in it 
expectations for the future concerning development of infrastructure and social 
reorganisation. Hence, we label Imidugudu as a case of ‘emergency development’. 
It was launched under the pressure of an emergency situation, but turned out to be 
far stretching in its implementations and implications. As we will see in the next 
chapter, it was also not without a history. 
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2. The Imidugudu policy: coming into being of a 
masterplan  
 
Immediately after the war in 1994, the Rwanda Ministry of Social Reintegration 
started to plan agglomeration sites with the support of the UNHCR. At that time there 
was no pressing housing need, but was expected that the New Case refugees would 
come back in the near future. The new government had adopted the Arusha Agree-
ment as law. This agreement concluded between the RPF and the Habyarimana 
government in August 1993, had stipulated that the Tutsi refugees in exile could 
not reclaim their former entitlements to houses and lots upon their repatriation. 
They would be compensated with formerly state owned land and would get support 
to reinstall themselves. In December 1996, when the influx of New Case returnees 
from Zaire created an acute problem of shelter, the Cabinet Council decided on a 
habitation policy for both urban and rural settlements. The policy encompassed far 
more then the accommodation of the needs of returning refugees. This was the outline 
of a grand engineering scheme that would radically alter the settlement patterns in the 
countryside. It addressed the entire population, not just the repatriates, and brought 
the detailed planning of rural space in the hands of government authorities. 
 The Cabinet Decision stated that the dispersed settlement pattern in the 
countryside was a waste of space, and therefore “all the rural inhabitants should be 
regrouped in villages (Imidugudu)” in order to separate space for habitation from 
space for agriculture and grazing. It called an end to the spontaneous settlement of 
people, and declared that from then on the capacity of the authorities should be 
strengthened in order to identify and distribute rural space. The policy statement 
further called for agrarian reform and the encouragement of activities outside of the 
agro-pastoral field.7 Some time after the Cabinet Council meeting, in January 1997, 
different Ministries came out with instructions on how the policy had to be 
implemented. Although the political and legal status of these instructions remained 
unclear for a long time, they gave an idea of the direction the policy was to take. The 
eventual aim of the policy was that the entire population would be regrouped in 
villages. These villages were going to be constructed with the help of Umuganda, a 
tradition of community labour stemming from the colonial days. It got prohibited to 
build new houses outside of areas designated for Imidugudu settlements. 
 The policy was going to be accompanied by the redistribution of land. How 
this was going to happen remained unclear. Until the drafting of this paper, in March 
1999, the only proposal for a new juridical framework for land reform which was 
made public was a document written by a FAO-consultant (Barrière, 1997).8 Under 
the existing legislation, the state formally held almost all the land, while in practice 
customary land rights regulated the access to land holdings. The FAO document 
proposed to perpetuate the state’s ownership to the land, and to formalise the 
customary practices. According to the proposal, the state could grant different 
forms of entitlement to land users, such as rights of passage, gathering, and 
cultivation. The document also contained measures to prevent the future 
subdivision of the land. 
                                                 
7
  Third resolution of the Cabinet in its meeting of December 13, 1996.  
8
  At the time of writing of this article (March-April 1999), a new proposal for land reform was 
discussed in Cabinet. 
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 From subsequent statements of the government several grounds for the policy 
to regroup the rural population in villages became clear. One consideration was 
efficiency: villages would facilitate the provision of services. Another consideration 
given was that the policy contributed to security and to reconciliation. It would be 
easier to defend villages than scattered households. The integration of different ethnic 
groups in the villages was expected to lead to informal and eventually relaxed 
relations between them. “When everybody is living together they share their work, 
their problems, their beer”. A central consideration, however, remained that the 
policy would address the problem of settlement and land use. This had been an 
ongoing issue since independence. 
 
 
Imidugudu in the line of earlier policies for housing and land use  
 
Together with Burundi, Rwanda had the highest population density in Africa, 
estimated by the end of the 1980s at 282 inhabitants per square kilometre (ACORD, 
1998:3).9 At the same time, it was the least urbanised country, with less than 10% of 
the population living in the cities, of which two thirds again in the capital city of 
Kigali (Hentic, 1995). The typical settlement pattern of Rwanda was formed by hills 
covered with a mosaic of scattered houses built near the neatly delineated banana 
‘plantations’ and agricultural fields of the households. This settlement pattern was 
considered the cultural practice of banana growers, but it was also the consequence of 
colonial practices, such as the scattered delivery of services by spatially competing 
churches and the discouragement of urbanisation. It was only in the 1950s that the 
colonial government started a programme to resettle some of the rural population in 
villages. The ‘paysannats’, as the villages were called, were settlements on idle lands, 
where families were allotted plots along the roadsides, of two hectares each, for 
agriculture and housing. The programme meant to intensify traditional agriculture and 
to achieve a better distribution of the population over the countryside (Silvestre, 
1974:8).  
 Few paysannats were formed during the colonial period, but the policy was 
pursued after independence, until the 1970s. Settlements were created in sparsely 
inhabited regions, and where lands were abandoned due to the 1959 exile of refugees. 
The settlers were encouraged to reduce the number of large cattle and to increase 
agriculture, and were given instructions to grow marketable crops, in particular 
coffee. The policy thus resulted in a more even distribution of the population over the 
countryside and an intensification of commercial agriculture. It was also tainted by 
ethnic dimensions, however. A region like the Bugesera (see the first case study 
below) became the host area for Tutsi families from Ruhengeri and other densely 
populated areas. These saw in the forced resettlement to this tsetse-infected region a 
scheme to eradicate the Tutsi. In the cases of resettlement in fertile areas, the policy 
was apparently used by local authorities to favour (Hutu) relatives and people from 
their own region by giving them good lands. The paysannats have become a 
substantial characteristic of the countryside in certain regions. In 1983 a total number 
of 55,000 families lived in such settlements (ACORD, 1998; Bart, 1993). Although 
                                                 
9
  For mid 1998, the population was estimated at 7.8 million people, or 303 people/ square 
kilometre (UN Resident Coordinator, Annual Report 1998; 5-6) 
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paysannats contributed to distribute the population over the countryside, they did not 
actually result in the formation of villages. Settlers tended to continue constructing 
scattered dwellings and landholdings still became fragmented through ‘inheritance’ 
practices. 
 In the course of the decades, the population continued to grow while non-
agricultural economic activities failed to take off, so that the people/land ratio 
continued to deteriorate. Estimates set the average landholding per family at 1.2 
hectare in 1978, going down to 0.94 in 1991, and reaching 0.7 in the post-war period 
(ACORD, 1998:4). Many writers on Rwanda regard the economic situation of 
pre-conflict Rwanda and especially the pressure on agricultural land as a central issue 
behind the violence (Prunier, 1997:364; Pottier, 1997; André, 1996; a.o.). According 
to Pottier (1997:1), “[i]n the build-up of the genocide, land scarcity and the despair of 
land-less, jobless youth were factors much larger than ethnicity itself”. Ethnicity, 
then, became the channel to unleash the growing socio-economic despair. This was 
painfully clear, when during the genocide Interahamwe promised people they would 
get the land of their victims, as one of the strategies to incite Hutu to kill their Tutsi 
relatives and neighbours.  
 
 
Land scarcity or land myth: competing narratives 
 
Although the mounting socio-economic pressure in the prelude of the war and 
genocide form a generally accepted social fact, the question is how to explain and 
solve this problem. Competing narratives distinguish the old Habyarimana 
government from the post-war government. Both narratives have the character of an 
explanatory story with a scenario for development (compare Roe, 1991). While for 
Habyarimana the central issue was the people/land ratio, the post-war government 
focuses on development planning and the diversification of the economy. 
 The Habyarimana government blamed the deplorable economic situation 
that had evolved in the early 1980s on the scarcity of agricultural land in 
combination with an increasing population. This people/land argument was 
increasingly turned into a suitable narrative to access donor funds, riding the 
popular themes of overpopulation and environmental depletion. At the same time it 
provided the government with a political argument against the aspirations of those 
Tutsi in exile that wanted to repatriate. In the 1980s’ negotiations on a possible 
repatriation of Old Case refugees, the Rwanda government claimed that the 
country was already overpopulated and that there was simply no space for 
repatriates (African Rights, 1994:15). While focusing on the agricultural 
implications of the people/land issue, the old government did little to encourage 
employment outside of agriculture (see: Brusten, 1996), and its practices were 
geared to keep the population in place. In particular, urbanisation was discouraged. 
The government even tried to diminish the importance of the cities by the removal 
of certain services from urban centres and the creation of modern services at a 
distance from urban centres. Strict mobility controls were introduced, among 
others in the form of  ‘permis de residence’ and by prohibiting anybody from 
residing in the city unless he or she could show proof of employment (Hentic, 
1995). It was only towards the end of the 1980s that some cracks started to show in 
this approach. 
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 A severe food shortage in 1987 exacerbated the enduring economic crisis and 
resulted in spontaneous population movements from regions without any land left to 
regions with more space. The government was finally forced to revise its restrictive 
migration policy. In 1988, it began a new programme, centred around so-called ‘pôles 
de développement’. Development poles were supposed to be multifunctional rural 
centres, providing non-agricultural employment opportunities. The pôles de 
développement were seen as an interface between the rural and the urban, which 
could simultaneously solve both the problem of increased land scattering and the lack 
of development in the cities (ARAMET, 1997). The new government policy found 
mainly expression in a limited number of projects implemented by a Rwandese NGO 
ARAMET (l'Association Rwandaise de Recherche et d'Appui en Aménagement du 
Territoire). This NGO helped to design the new development narrative that was to 
guide the Imidugudu policy. 
 ARAMET was founded in 1988 with the objective to support local initiatives 
for development by means of the structural reorganisation of space and the creation of 
employment outside agriculture (ARAMET, 1997). Before the war in 1994, 
ARAMET had started to create pôles de développement in a few centres. They were 
located in existing settlements that were considered to have potential for growth. A 
development plan was designed for each of the areas, which was implemented 
through a range of projects including the creation of services, vocational training and 
the provision of credit. After the war, some of the management of ARAMET fled the 
country with the New Case refugees, but the programme was nonetheless continued. 
The leaders of the NGO had distinct ideas about the land question, which they tried to 
disseminate in policy-making circles. They organised seminars, lobbied with 
politicians from their institutional network, got some research contracts with the 
government, and were invited to participate in the National Habitat Commission.  
 The central idea of ARAMET was that the core problem of Rwanda was 
not overpopulation or land scarcity in itself, but a lack of proper planning. This 
had, in their view, resulted in unfavourable land use and settlement patterns and 
had thwarted the possibilities for a more diversified economy. This was also the 
idea adopted by the new post-war government, forming the basic rationale of the 
Imidugudu policy. The central tenet was that the socio-economic pressure could be 
resolved through better land use planning, better settlement patterns, and economic 
growth outside agriculture. This new development narrative also provided the 
answer to the problem of repatriation. It supported the reconciliation message, 
advocated by the new government, that the country had enough resources to 
sustain all Rwandese people, and that every Rwandese living abroad was welcome 
to repatriate. 
 In its rationale, the Imidugudu policy represented an integrated approach, 
based on the techniques of development planning. As we shall see, this was not 
how it always evolved in practice. In some cases, the envisaged policy was 
followed (see Gilad, forthcoming). In other places, as one of our case studies 
suggests, the techniques of planning could also turn into a rigid force, with the 
emphasis almost exclusively on the element of habitation, ignoring the issues of 
land use and economic growth outside agriculture. Before moving to the case 
studies, let us first consider the discussions raised by the policy and the kind of 
support it engendered. 
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3. Imidugudu as a widely supported controversy10 
 
A number of Imidugudu villages have been built with exclusively local resources, 
but a lot of them have had some form of international support. UNHCR has by far 
been the major supporter, providing resources for policy making and planning, and 
subcontracting numerous NGOs to implement housing programmes. Another 
important contributor was WFP, which provided ‘Food for Work’. The UNDP also 
supported a limited number of settlement sites. A Joint Reintegration Programming 
Unit (JRPU) was set up in Rwanda to co-ordinate the efforts of the different UN 
agencies. Although there was thus considerable support for the policy, some other 
actors have withheld theirs. Hardly any bilateral aid has been made available for 
the programme. There were also a number of NGOs that have critically refused to 
engage in the housing scheme, or that negotiated certain conditions before 
supporting it.  
 Although few actors wholeheartedly embraced the policy, it nonetheless 
has engendered much international support. The formation of villages has had 
more priority than, for example, the reform of agriculture or other programmes for 
which maybe equally pressing needs have been identified. However, this has never 
been without discussion. As turned out from reports and interviews,11 Imidugudu 
has been controversial from the start. In this section we explore the controversy it 
entailed, and try to figure out why the policy has nonetheless been able to reach the 
scale it has with the support of many international organisations.  
 We will not be able to find a complete answer to this question. Programmes 
tend to get a life of their own and, once started, find continuation without 
continuous reflection on why to move on. Partial explanations we find at three 
levels. In the first place, we shall look at the rationale of the plan, and the 
arguments raised in favour and against it. As we will see, for every criticism 
counter arguments availed, and the policy and its implementation contained 
enough ambiguities to feed both contenders and supporters with empirical 
substance to their claims. However, decisions to support or not to support do not 
always follow from rational considerations of arguments and calculated 
assessments of needs and risks alone. They are complicated by two other kinds of 
factors.  
 One of these, we may label as emotional. Emotional responses are rarely 
given analytic attention. Or, to be more precise, emotions of ordinary people are 
taken into account, for example in cases of ethnic hatred, but emotional responses 
are normally not associated with heads of programmes, technical consultants and 
other office bearers in development. However, when talking to these people it was 
clear that to some of them Imidugudu was appealing, whereas others had an 
equally strong aversion against the programme. We found this related to cultural 
                                                 
10
 At the time of drafting this paper, a new phase had started in the history of Imidugudu, because of 
the large number of internally displaced people in the North West of the country, for which the 
government was seeking funds to implement Imidigudu. Considering that the situation was still 
very fluid when writing this paper and that the North West had not been part of the fieldwork, 
because of the difficult security situation in that area, Imidugudu in the North West has not been 
taken into account in this paper. 
11
 Apart from secondary material, this section is based on interviews with officers of 25 
international NGOs and UN organization, as well as a limited number of donor representatives. 
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factors, such as the need to believe in feasible solutions and to be able to provide a 
response to the atrocities that have taken place in Rwanda. 
 Finally, on a more mundane plane, we will look into the politics of 
development, the dynamic relation between the different institutional stakeholders, 
namely the government, non-governmental organisations and funding agencies. 
Power relations, institutional interests and matters of organisational mandates 
provide additional explanations for why development evolves as it does. The case 
of Imidugudu, as we will find, sheds particularly light on the politics of the so-
called continuum between relief and development. 
 
 
Questions and considerations 
 
This section elaborates on the questions and considerations that played a role in the 
controversy surrounding the Imidugudu programme. Those considerations were 
one of the constitutive elements shaping the response of international agencies. 
What the different actors involved said against but also in favour of Imidugudu 
concerned three aspects: the appropriateness of village formation programmes in 
light of experiences elsewhere, and in particular for the Rwandese context; the 
political aims and complications; and its feasibility regarding implementation. The 
Imidugudu programme was surrounded by a number of ambiguities, which was 
among others the result of the lack of in-depth insight in local implementation. A 
number of these ambiguities will be addressed in the two case studies in the latter 
part of this paper.  
 
Appropriateness 
A first question that constantly reappeared in discussions on Imidugudu was the 
general appropriateness of villagisation programmes. Rwanda is not the first 
country to try such an approach. In Africa the examples of Tanzania, Ethiopia, and 
Mozambique come to mind. Villagisation programmes in these countries have not 
been favourably evaluated over time: they were considered expensive failures, 
violently enforced, causing large scale social and economic disruptions at great 
costs for those involved (Scott, 1998; for a recent review of the experiences of 
villagisation in East-Africa see Cannon Lorgen, 1999). These experiences were, of 
course, known among the international organisations confronted with requests to 
support Imidugudu, and raised substantial caution regarding the Rwandese plans.  
 The Rwanda government’s riposte to this caution was given in August 
1997, by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Firstly, the government emphasised the 
“fundamental cultural dimension” of settlement, on which grounds it felt that: 
“Rwanda cannot and should not base its rural development and settlement 
planning on comparison to other countries where similar programmes 
have failed” (Mininter, 1997). 
  The same document claimed that a major difference between the Rwanda 
case and the aforementioned experiences was that in Rwanda the resettlement 
would be done on a voluntary basis, making use of local knowledge and 
participation: 
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“Participants will be encouraged, through economic incentives as well as 
the provision of socio-economic infrastructure […]. Beneficiaries will be 
encouraged to participate in the planning, design, and layout of their 
villages. They will participate in the construction of their own houses” 
(ibid.). 
 A second reason why Imidugudu was not deemed appropriate was found in 
the Rwandese context, in which agriculturists were used to live scattered over the 
countryside in houses built near their fields. Critics stated that the increasing distance 
to farmland would obstruct the potential for agricultural production. It would limit 
soil improvement with manure and household waste and would slow down 
production while people would not be able to protect their crops properly. It was, 
moreover, considered to be against the cultural conceptions and preferences of the 
population. It was argued that the local language had not even a concept for ‘village’, 
and it was pointed out that in earlier settlement programmes people were not very 
interested in villages (see Bart, 1993). 
 The Rwanda government, on the other hand, claimed that agriculture would 
improve if valuable soils were freed for agricultural production, and that it would be 
beneficial for the environment, if habitation got concentrated (Mininter, 1997). The 
cultural argument was counterpoised by stating that scattered residencies were more 
the product of colonial and post-colonial practices than a Rwanda ‘cultural trait’. 
Earlier policies always discouraged the evolution to other land use patterns. Among 
others, colonisation disrupted the growth of pre-colonial trading centres. Competition 
among different churches resulted in an extensive but scattered service provision, and 
the church also actively discouraged urbanisation. One European consultant stated in 
this respect: 
“Rwanda is probably the only country in the world where I would say that 
there is a lack of urbanisation, rather than too much migration to the 
cities”. 
 A final question raised on the appropriateness of the policy concerned the 
exclusive nature of the solution opted for in Imidugudu. For some time, it appeared 
that the Rwanda government saw Imidugudu as the only form of settlement fit for 
the entire country. Such a blueprint approach would not reckon with the regional 
diversity in the country, and seemed to counter the policy aim of economic 
diversification. Only recently, and sporadically, have policy discussions opened up 
to consider a more varied approach to settlement and population movements, for 
example by starting to consider urban policies, that would allow for the growth of 
Kigali and other towns. 
 
Politics of Imidugudu 
Some people interviewed were aware of the problematic aspects of a policy like 
Imidugudu, but nonetheless saw the need for such a programme in Rwanda, due to 
the special political circumstances. In the first place, as someone said: 
“There was the political need of the government to make a gesture for 
reconciliation. Imidugudu conveyed to all the New Case Load refugees 
staying on the other side of the border: See, we are making all the effort to 
enable your return”. 
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 In the second place, many pointed to considerations of security. With 
increasing Interahamwe rebel activity in different parts of the country, Imidugudu 
was presented as a measure to both better protect people and to enable firmer 
control on rebel movements. The question was, however, if this consideration 
applied for the whole country. The Rwanda government had always maintained 
that the policy would enhance security and reconciliation. In the above mentioned 
document, for example, it stated that: 
“Regrouped settlement will in the future constitute the best formula to 
ensure not only security but also national reconciliation because the people 
who live together will have common interests for which they work 
together to preserve. Close to the villages, police and gendarmerie will be 
established […]” (Mininter, 2/8/1997). 
 Among critics, on the other hand, there were doubts about possible hidden 
aims of the policy. When it became clear that the programme would not only cover 
repatriates, but the resettlement of the entire population, some observers suspected 
the Government of Rwanda of having a hidden strategy. It was, for example, 
suggested that the government aimed at improving the position of the Old Case 
returnees and was looking for ways to bend the outcome of the Arusha Agreement. 
The reorganisation proposed in the Imidugudu policy could well be interpreted as 
an attempt to redistribute land in favour of the Old Case refugees and the genocide 
survivors. According to these observers, the programme might increase 
polarisation and temper reconciliation.  
 Since the impact and political effects could not be accurately assessed at the 
start of the programme, the matter of whether to support it, thus mainly depended on 
the level of trust agencies put in the new Rwanda government and its proclaimed 
objectives. While some believed the government was trying to install a ‘Tutsicracy’ 
(see for instance Prunier, 1997:369), or represented urban elite interests only at the 
expense of the majority of poor country dwellers, others considered the government 
as genuinely seeking reconciliation and development. Several other factors 
complicated a proper assessment of the intentions of the present government.  
 Firstly, the security situation had continued to make the years since 1994, into 
a period of peace and war at the same time. In response to continued Interahamwe 
activity, Rwanda had been engaged in military operations in the Kibeho refugee 
camps (1995), in the North-western provinces of the country (until late 1998) and in 
neighbouring Congo, where Rwanda troops were involved in the rebellion against 
President Laurent-Désiré Kabilla, which started in August 1998. While these military 
operations continued, with severe consequences for human, social and economic life 
(see African Rights, 1998), the government was at the same time busy rehabilitating 
the country. The result was a multi-faceted government. It was shrouded in the 
secrecy of military operations, but at the same time engaged in a relative transparent 
democratisation process, among others leading to local elections in March 1999.  
 Secondly, the effect of government policies on the ethnic relations in the 
country and the possible ethnic properties of these policies, were difficult to gauge 
since ethnicity had officially disappeared from public discourse, as decreed by the 
government.12 This decree was meant to contribute to reconciliation, but also 
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 Even without this decree, ethnicity is so sensitive that it has almost turned into a taboo. This seems 
especially the case in the interaction between expatriates and Rwandese. Rwandese among 
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rendered possible ethnic implications invisible and complicated political discussions 
on programmes like Imidugudu.  
 Thirdly, the government and its bureaucracy were not homogeneous. There 
were political factions and different social networks, for example according to 
country of former exile. There was also variation in the personal commitment of 
different government officials, with some suspected to define their interests primarily 
in terms of their own economic enterprises, while others were generally admired for 
their sincerity and relentless efforts to improve the situation in Rwanda. These 
differences in the government resulted in contradicting signals and practices and led 
to different interpretations of the nature and aims of the government.  
 In the particular case of the Imidugudu policy, some people interviewed found 
it difficult to weigh the different rhetoric messages and relate these to practice. Some 
high government officials, including secretaries, displayed a relaxed attitude 
regarding the scope and pace of Imidugudu, and seemed not to attach central value to 
this programme in relation to other government policies. Others spoke about the 
policy in flowery speech, emphasising its essential value for the ‘renewal’ of the 
country, and setting highly unrealistic target dates when they expected the whole 
population to be regrouped in villages. This was all the more confusing, given the few 
official statements regarding the policy. The main question remained unanswered: 
which approach was followed in practice. Did Imidugudu get toned down in its 
implementation, or did local actors follow the rhetoric of some of these national 
figures? As our case studies will illustrate, no general answer can be given to this 
question, because of the diversity in implementing practices at municipal and local 
levels. 
 Given the complications in assessing the political intentions and possible 
implications of the Imidugudu policy, some organisations refrained from supporting 
the policy, but many were giving the policy for the time being the benefit of the 
doubt, and supported it despite some reservations they may have had.  
 
Implementation 
The major rationale for getting engaged in housing programmes, for example for the 
UNHCR, was the immense need for shelter, due to destruction and the massive 
repatriation of refugees. Early 1997, this was estimated by the government at 300,000 
families. There were, however, some questions, on the exact need for housing. The 
figures were based on estimated numbers of future repatriates, which according to 
some were set too high. Secondly, the question remained whether housing was in all 
cases the primary need, especially for the high number of families that had found 
temporary shelter by sharing housing with relatives. No possible alternatives to the 
plan were explored, and as one UN officer said, whose agency was not involved in 
Imidugudu: “There have been no studies to alternatives, until then I would not build a 
single house”. 
                                                                                                                                       
themselves discuss ethnic issues in private. All expatriates do too. They have their names in code for 
the different ethnic groups (such as the tall ones and the short ones, the Thai and the Hungarians, the 
dots and the stripes, and numerous other variations), which allow them to speak among themselves 
about ethnicity in an unobtrusive way. The subject has, however, mainly disappeared from public 
discourse. 
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 The questions regarding the need for housing became more poignant when it 
concerned the regrouping of the population already having residences. This implied 
in many cases the destruction of the original house, in order to rebuild another house, 
sometimes just a few hundred meters away from the old house. This raised the 
question of enforcement. Although the government had stated that participation was 
to be voluntary, in many regions regrouping in effect was compulsory, and non-
participation fined. Stories circulated about forced evictions, but it remained unclear 
whether these were isolated incidents, or whether these had become the rule.  
 Other questions concerned actual implementation. It soon turned out that in 
the beginning, implementation had met many problems. There were cases in which 
planning had been haphazard, and critics pointed to settlements that lacked even 
the most basic resources like water. After the first year, however, implementing 
organisations started to acknowledge these shortcomings and begun to address 
them. From then on, agencies carried out need assessments and tried to provide 
services accordingly. It remained to be seen, however, how successful this was or 
could be. While the construction of houses continued, it seemed that services and 
other measures continued to lag substantially behind. Doubts were raised whether 
it was financially feasible to provide services in all settlement sites. 
 When the programme was underway for some time, critical comments on 
Imidugudu were exacerbated when stories started to circulate about empty ghost 
towns, and reports commented on the low occupation rate of the houses in 
settlement sites. This called into question the real need for housing, and the 
willingness of people to join the programme. However, several surveys that have 
been conducted since suggest that occupancy was rapidly scaling up, and empty 
houses became more an exception than a rule.  
 Several of our interviews were with officers directly involved in the 
programme. The narratives of these officers invariably centred around the theme of 
‘emergency’. In their view, the emergency nature of the situation legitimated the 
initial neglect of the procedures according to which beneficiaries were identified and 
their low levels of participation during construction. The emergency was also cited to 
explain why agencies had embarked on the Imidugudu policy, without much 
consideration about its feasibility or the appropriateness of making it the first priority 
for development.  
 
 
Affections and aversions 
 
When interviewing international officers of relief and development institutions, 
considerations about Imidugudu were coloured by the simple like or dislike for the 
programme. Both negative and positive connotations were related to the same set of 
properties of the policy. It was a grand scheme, promising a blueprint solution for the 
vast problems of the country, and highly visible in the landscape. Either considered 
beautiful or ugly, the neat settlements with long rows and blocks of uniform houses 
evoked strong images with observers that got reflected in their assessment of the 
programme. 
 The aversion of some people could, among others, be located in the grandness 
with which some national politicians advocated the policy. Rwandese political culture 
is characterised by the kind of speeches that Western observers often perceive of as 
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rhetoric. Replete of superlatives, and with little reference to actual performance, they 
sound unbelievable to many ears, and taken literally, they sound scary for their 
unbridled objectives, targets and ambitions. Few of the international observers 
appeared to appreciate this kind of ‘rhetoric’, but some believed these were not 
reflective of actual practice. Others, however, got scared away from the policy, and 
wanted to have nothing to do with it as a result. In the same vein, the image of 
conformity conveyed by the settlements may have evoked reactions of distaste in 
some people.    
 Being Western development scholars ourselves, having arrived in Rwanda 
four years after the war, we found it in first instance difficult to understand why so 
many actors approved of the policy. Development studies have amply shown the 
risks involved in blueprint, top-down schemes. As Emery Roe opened his article 
on development narratives: “No one has a good word for blueprint development” 
(1991:287; see also Long and van der Ploeg, 1989, Long and Long, 1992). In a 
recent book, James Scott (1998) recaptured present insights on certain grand 
schemes, including villagisation projects that “aimed to improve the human 
condition but failed”. These projects shared a modernist ideology, a belief in the 
possibilities to create rational order by scientific means. According to Scott, the 
reliance on scientific implementation, with disregard for local knowledge and 
practices, formed the major reason for the failure of these schemes.  
 Many of the international officers have been students of development and 
are familiar with the literature on limitations of development planning and 
blueprints. Having probably experienced such limitations themselves earlier in 
their career, their engagement in the policy seemed to call for an explanation. One 
such explanation may be found in the difficulties to learn from complicated 
problems. As Roe observed probing into the perseverance of blueprint 
development: 
“Indeed, the pressure to generate narratives about development is directly 
proportional to the ambiguity decision makers experience over the 
development process. The more uncertain things seem at the micro level, 
the greater the tendency to see the scale of uncertainty at the macro level 
to be so enormous as to require broad explanatory narratives that can be 
operationalized into standard approaches with widespread application” 
(Roe, 1991:288). 
 This observation seems very astute for emergency situations as in the case 
of the returning refugees in Rwanda. In this case, both the ambiguities and the 
pressure to act were enormous, creating the need for a straightforward narrative 
from which an equally straightforward line of action followed.  
  
The appeal of the Imidugudu policy to a number of actors was reinforced by the 
memories of the atrocities that had taken place in the country. Few events in recent 
history have so much shocked humankind as the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The 
slaughtering of hundreds of thousands people by hand, in a fashion that was both 
organised as full of raging madness, has left a deep impression. Many people were 
convinced that after the genocide a radical change had taken place in this country. 
Several staff of agencies working in Rwanda commented that it was now a new 
country. One of them, who had not been working here prior to the war, said: 
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“I think it is better that I was not here before. Because it is a new country. 
People who worked here before, may make mistakes because they think it 
is all the same, but it is a totally new country”. 
 From an outsider’s point of view, this remark seemed to be more related to 
wishful thinking than a state of fact. Others, in contrast, claimed that the Rwanda 
situation needed radical solutions, exactly because the country had not changed. 
They saw in the continuation of pre-war problems the foreboding of renewed 
violence and therefore considered radical change imperative. One of them said:  
“Radical solutions are inevitable. Something has to happen, and we cannot 
leave the situation unchanged, just because that would be the tradition. 
There is no question about the need for drastic measures, the only question 
remaining is how to do it”. 
 The Imidugudu policy was particularly suitable to the felt need for a 
feasible, drastic programme with a high power to change. It literally promised to 
renew the country. It envisaged that everybody would get a place in neat, 
integrated communities.13 The construction of these communities, a major job in 
itself, appeared moreover as a visible and do-able operation. We suggest, then, that 
part of the support for Imidugudu may have stemmed from its appeal to build a 
new, radically altered and ordered society. This appeal may have played an 
invisible role in the deliberations of development officers in response to an 
emergency situation. 
 
 
Institutional interfaces, mandates and interests 
 
Agencies do not act merely according to the rationale of their policies and discourses. 
Other dynamics shape decisions and practices, such as institutional and individual 
interests, power games and dynamic interactions with other stakeholders. We found 
three such factors to be particularly relevant: pressure of the government on NGOs 
and their intent to stay in the country; institutional competition and the mandate of 
relief organisations; and the role of the UNHCR funding. In addition, economic 
interests may have played a big role in the programme. 
 
The Rwanda government and the international organisations. 
NGO activity is often thought to be separate from state projects, especially in some 
African conflict situations, where states are considered weak. In the case of Rwanda, 
however, the state is relatively strong (Prunier 1995), and it would be a mistake to 
draw a sharp dividing line between state activity and so-called civil society 
programmes. NGOs engaged in housing as part of the Imidugudu policy, reported 
that local authorities had a large hand in the implementation of the programmes, since 
they selected the site as well as the beneficiaries. Often, NGOs have the objective to 
assist vulnerable groups, but in certain cases the selection of these vulnerable people 
was left to the local authorities. One staff admitted that he had no idea how the local 
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 The following anecdote wonderfully illustrates the point. One foreign visitor taken to the 
countryside to visit some Imidugudu exclaimed: “How wonderful these houses. Maybe they 
should still add mailboxes at the front doors.”   
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authorities selected beneficiaries, and added: “It is better not to get involved in those 
kind of issues”. 
 In addition, several NGO officers interviewed pointed to instances where 
local authorities put pressure on them to get engaged in a housing programme. One 
NGO officer related how meeting after meeting he was asked to start housing. After 
this NGO nonetheless refrained from constructing settlements, a government officer 
was heard at some point to compare this NGO unfavourably to another NGO that had 
complied to their request. A number of NGO staff interviewed stipulated that the 
choice of activities was practically dictated by local government authorities. One of 
them said: “In fact, each NGO was allocated a couple of programmes, mostly in the 
areas where they had been giving emergency aid”. Another commented: “It depends 
on local authorities which direction our programme goes”. 
 The reason why NGOs were vulnerable to this kind of pressure was, of 
course, that they wanted to stay in the country. NGOs needed programmes for their 
own existence, employment and funding, and they wanted to protect and continue 
those activities that they considered as a valuable contribution for the Rwandese 
population. At the same time, they were aware that the Rwandese government takes 
its sovereignty serious, and has at occasion expelled NGOs from the country.14 
Although government pressure was apparent in certain regions, it has to be stressed 
that the picture is not the same everywhere. From the interviews, a picture emerged 
where the amount of pressure and the priorities given to Imidugudu varies per region. 
In Cyangugu Préfecture, for example, the local authorities put much less emphasis on 
Imidugudu and encouraged NGOs to do other rehabilitation work instead. Some 
NGOs stated that they experienced quite some room for manoeuvre and had found it 
relatively easy to convince local authorities that they had other priorities than housing 
programmes. 
 
Agency interests and mandates 
An UNHCR officer stated: “There is no more emergency since the end of 1997, when 
Rwanda entered into a development phase”. Some of the international NGOs 
continued to label the situation in the country as one of emergency throughout 1998, 
but most agencies shared the opinion of the UNHCR that the emergency phase was 
over. Yet, quite a number of relief NGOs and agencies stayed on in the country. 
Some agencies had a mandate allowing them to facilitate the transition to 
development. One project officer said in October 1998:  
“Rwanda is still in a situation of emergency, this backs maintaining a 
presence. Slowly we move further along the development spectrum”.  
 Thinking in terms of a spectrum, or a set of fixed post-emergency stages 
that run from relief via rehabilitation to development is hard to maintain for 
empirical situations. Yet, the stages have gathered an institutional reality because 
much funding is organised accordingly (see Frerks et al, 1995, Frerks, 1998:28-9). 
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 In December 1995, the Rwanda government announced that 42 out of the 116 international NGOs 
had to stop their programme and leave the country. The reason given was that these NGOs were not 
effective and/ or did not coordinate. Very little has been written about this episode. Those 
commenting about it said that indeed some of these groups were not very professional. However, it is 
also believed that some of the NGOs were singled out because they were considered too critical with 
the Rwanda government.  
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The question whether Rwanda was still under emergency could thus be of crucial 
importance to justify the ongoing presence of an organisation, and led to 
organisational competition. In the Rwanda situation, such competition was 
apparent between the UNHCR and other development oriented UN organisations. 
In 1997 the UNDP and the UNHCR together set up the Joint Reintegration 
Programming Unit, in an effort to bridge the relief – development divide and to 
improve co-ordination among their agencies (UNDP, 1998). 
 The legitimisation of an organisational presence also depended on the 
activities the organisation developed. As it turned out, housing programmes could 
easily fit in mandates of both relief and development organisations. Relief 
organisations engaged in housing programmes as an extension of their mandate to 
provide shelter. Two relief NGO officers openly admitted that they justified their 
presence in the country by heading their housing activities under shelter 
programmes. Remarkably, the UNHCR in its writings consistently spoke of 
‘shelter’ programmes instead of  ‘settlement’ or ‘housing’. Development 
organisations, on the other hand, could defend their involvement in housing 
because it was considered conditional before people could care for their 
development. As an officer of the World Food Programme stated:  
“Our shelter activities were a contribution to food production. If people do 
not have a house, they can not concentrate on agriculture. People are 
constantly busy to get money to construct their houses, so they are always 
hungry”.  
 Imidugudu was thus facilitated by the fact that it could be fitted in the 
mandates of a wide range of organisations.  
 
Funding and other economic interests 
One institutional reason why many NGOs, both international and local, engaged in 
housing programmes was the availability of funding for such projects. As was 
mentioned above, the UNHCR acted as a major supporter of Imidugudu. It also 
availed of the largest funds (120 Million in 1997), most of which were 
subcontracted to NGOs. Some NGOs simply joined the bandwagon and took on 
housing projects, because that was where the money was. As one NGO officer 
stated:  
“If UNHCR offers you a job you are happy to accept it. We are only 
invited, the government and UNHCR set the policy”.  
 Finally, we have to take into account the power of a programme with big 
money and lots of material. Projects may be valued more for the development they 
contain, than the development they bring (Hilhorst, 1997). People are, for example, 
often more interested in the employment generated by NGOs than in their 
programmes. Likewise, implementers of infrastructure and other hardware projects 
sometimes benefit more than the supposed beneficiaries. The amounts of 
galvanised iron sheets, nails, and other equipment needed for the Imidugudu 
settlements were indeed big, and the economic stakes high. Some people suggested 
that a lobby of the industry of galvanised iron was one of the driving forces behind 
the programme. Besides, the programme was surrounded by rumours, and some 
proven cases, of corruption, petty thefts and not so petty embezzlements. 
 
Imidugudu, villagisation in Rwanda; A case of emergency development? 
25 
Concluding 
 
The review of controversies around Imidugudu shows there were grounds to either 
support or reject the policy. Moreover, there were a lot of ambiguities. So far, most 
of the discussions have been general and little can yet be said about the impact of 
the policy for different regions of the country. One conclusion about the 
constraints of ‘emergency development’, however, stands out at this point. Tim 
Allen (1996), as well as other authors have advocated to break away from the 
above mentioned continuum from emergency relief to development, and instead 
opt for an integrated approach. The Imidugudu policy may be viewed as a case of 
‘emergency development’, which on the one hand contains traces of earlier 
ambitions for long term development and on the other hand has long-term 
development consequences by its very nature. It calls for some caution about the 
wisdom of emergency development. In this case, agencies embarked on the 
programme in the emergency of a situation of massive repatriation into the 
country. However, under pressure of the emergency, the programme was started 
without feasibility studies, and without exploring possible alternatives. Moreover, 
the emergency seems to have lured agencies to accept a blueprint policy, which 
under ‘normal’ conditions of ‘development’ planning they might not have 
accepted. The programme also complicated the co-ordination of different 
organisational mandates but simultaneously offered to each a sufficient 
legitimisation for continued involvement. 
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4. Imidugudu in practice 
 
The two cases below, of Imidugudu in the communities of Kanzenze and Gisenyi, 
intend to provide insight in the local dimensions of the programme. They aim to show 
how the national policy of Imidugudu is shaped in local implementation through the 
interaction of different stakeholders. These are the local authorities, the implementing 
NGOs and the local population. We consider them as strategizing actors that act 
according to their own interpretation of the policy, their interests, and their 
opportunities. The national policy is supposed to provide the guidelines, but what 
really matters, is of course the interpretation of the national policy by local 
authorities, and the way they adapt the guidelines to what they consider as the local 
particularities. Likewise, the way NGO staff sets about the implementation depends 
on their relationship with the beneficiaries and on how they perceive their 
institutional and personal interests in the programme. The local population tries to 
assess the programme and to maximise the opportunities offered. Local people have 
to fit the programme into their livelihood practices. These practices not only express 
how people make their living in different ways, but also how they deal with their 
needs, interests and values in the different social fields in which they are active (see 
Long, 1997:11). Life in Imidugudu will thus not only be described as a number of 
daily activities and a set of possibilities and constraints, but also in terms of how 
people give meaning to what they experience. The emergent properties at the level of 
the Imidugudu are the result of the combined acts of all these stakeholders in the local 
contingencies. It is expected that these contain much diversity and that have 
unintended outcomes, but nonetheless they provide insights that should be taken into 
account when assessing the national policy. 
 
The case of Kanzenze commune15 was chosen because Imidugudu played an 
important role in this community, among others because the community suffered 
heavily during the genocide. NGOs have constructed quite a number of villages in the 
area. Only recently programmes have been started in which the local authorities 
directly took the lead in implementation. Gisenyi secteur on the other hand has gone 
ahead in the implementation of the Imidugudu programme. A few NGOs 
implemented sites in nearby areas, however, most implementation has been done by 
the population itself. Before the war, many Tutsi were living in Kanzenze commune. 
Gisenyi secteur was predominantly a Hutu area, while after the war a lot of Tutsi 
settled there. Considering that ‘ethnicity’ and ‘reconciliation’ played a role in the 
discussion about Imidugudu this was taken into account in the selection of the cases.16  
 
                                                 
15
 In Rwanda, the term commune refers to a municipality, headed by a bourgmestre. In total there 
are 155 communes in Rwanda. Each commune is divided in about ten secteurs, headed by 
conseillers. Secteurs are divided into cellules headed by a responsable, who is responsible for 
around 100 families. Those again are divided in groups of houses, headed by a nyumba kumi 
(literally a head of ten houses, in practice this may be up to around twenty). All these officials are 
appointed. With the first local elections held in March 1999, this situation was changing towards 
elected local government representatives.   
16
 For a more extensive discussion on reconciliation and resettlement see the case studies of mixed 
settlements by Gilad (forthcoming), that focussed on this issue specifically. 
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The case of Kanzenze 
 
Kanzenze was one of three municipalities forming the Bugesera Region, at one-
hour ride south of Kigali. In the area, two settlements were chosen for in-depth 
study: Mayange, constructed early 1996, and Gahembe, which was constructed 
early 1997.  
 Kanzenze had a dry climate, with only 850 mm rain a year and dry seasons 
sometimes lasting up to four months. Due to this climatic factor and because of the 
presence of the tsetse fly, this region remained sparsely inhabited until the early 
1960s, when the government resettled Tutsi families from the North to this area (see 
Chapter 3). This forced resettlement was followed by an influx of voluntary migrants 
in the 1970s, who came from overpopulated areas in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. The 
newcomers were mainly incorporated in the paysannats, as were described above. At 
present, Kanzenze commune has a number of 161 inhabitants per square kilometre 
(Préfecture de Kigali-rural, 1998:10), which is still considerably less than the national 
average. 
 Kanzenze suffered some of the worst atrocities during the genocide, including 
massacres at the churches of Nyamata and Ntarama with a death toll of thousands 
each (see African Rights, 1994:22ff). About 35% of the houses were damaged or 
destroyed during the war. Immediately after the war, a number of Old Case 
repatriates settled in the area, some to reunite with their relatives, others because they 
could not go to their own ‘home’ area due to ongoing security problems. By the end 
of 1996, large numbers of New Case repatriates came home from Zaire and Tanzania, 
leading to a serious housing problem. For an estimated 2,000 families out of a total of 
16,000 there were no houses (ZOA, 1997-draft).  
 
Imidugudu actors: local government and NGOs 
The section in the local bureaucracy dealing with the settlements in Kanzenze was 
the ‘Habitat Commission’. It was headed by the Mayor of Kanzenze, a man from 
the area, who had joined the RPF during its guerrilla actions in the North, and who 
came back to the commune when the war was over. One of the two municipal 
officers of the Commission was also local and survived the genocide in Kanzenze. 
The other one had stayed in Burundi for more than twenty years, but had relatives 
in the area. The Commission was further composed of the ‘conseillers’, the heads 
of the different secteurs of the commune. 
 The way these local authorities explained Imidugudu reflected the national 
rationale quite accurately, and they gave the policy a high priority. Their main 
motivations to get people settled in villages were the envisaged agronomic and 
developmental advantages (Préfecture de Kigali Rural, 1998:27). According to the 
Sous-préfet of the province (Préfecture) under which Kanzenze resorts: 
“The shortage of land should be approached in a scientific way: houses 
have to be built on infertile grounds”.  
 Apart from efficient land-use, the building of roads and health centres and 
the provision of other services was an advantage often quoted. Reconciliation and 
integration of the repatriates, new refugees and survivors was given as another 
positive outcome of the villages. As the Sous-préfet stated:  
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“If people come to live together they will also start working together. 
When everybody is living together you share your work, your problems 
and your beer”.  
 The rationale for Imidugudu according to these municipal officials thus 
followed closely the national considerations, with little reference to particular local 
conditions.  
 By the end of 1998, ten settlement sites had been finished or were still 
under construction in the commune of Kanzenze. Most of these were built by 
NGOs, others by different (local) Ministries. The Mayange site was the first village 
to be constructed in Kanzenze. the selection of the beneficiaries started in July 
1995 and the construction in the beginning of 1996. The work in Gahembe started 
in the beginning of 1997. 
 Mayange site was constructed by FAH (Fond Africaine d’Habitat). Initially, 
this NGO had seemed very reliable. Its director for resettlement had helped in the 
early formulations of the national policy. The NGO made a good impression on 
donor agencies and generated a lot of funds. To the great dismay of the local 
authorities, FAH never completed Mayange site, since somewhere in the process the 
budget finished. The same happened in other sites where FAH worked. As a result, 
the organisation gained a bad reputation locally, and was considered highly corrupt.17  
 Gahembe was constructed by ACORD, an NGO that had been established in 
Rwanda in 1979. ACORD had a much better reputation locally. Housing was only 
one among the concerns of the organisation: others included projects for agriculture, 
cattle, and a social programme. This meant that, unlike FAH that specialised on 
building houses, ACORD intended to build a more encompassing relationship with 
the beneficiaries. ACORD neither had been able to finish construction of the intended 
100 houses. After the construction of 61 houses the funding was depleted. The 
expectation in Gahembe was that ACORD would still finish the job once additional 
funds were found. 
 
Beneficiaries of the settlements 
Both Mayange and Gahembe answered a housing need, created by the large 
number of repatriates. The selection of beneficiaries was done before the 
implementation started. For Mayange, selection took already place in July 1995. 
This site was meant for Old Case repatriates who had temporarily taken residence 
in different villages all over Kanzenze commune. They had found accommodation 
in shops and other commercial buildings, thus obstructing the reconstruction of the 
local economy, or lived in houses of New Case refugees expected to come home in 
the near future. The list of beneficiaries was made by the Habitat Commission. 
 The selection of beneficiaries for Gahembe happened in a different way, 
with participation of all stakeholders. ACORD, the implementing NGO first 
formulated the criteria for selection, deciding to prioritise vulnerable groups. 
Beneficiaries came from the same secteur. The Habitat Commission, with the help 
of local officers of this secteur, then made a list of possible beneficiaries on the 
basis of these criteria. This list was discussed in a community gathering in the 
                                                 
17
 In the case of this particular NGO, a donor investigation indeed confirmed the allegation of 
corruption. 
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concerned secteur, where each proposed family had to be approved by the 
gathering. This participatory procedure was perhaps vulnerable to some 
manipulation. In a few exceptional cases beneficiaries did not meet the criteria, but 
used the allocation for instance to build a second house. On the whole, however, it 
can be considered successful: the population of Gahembe generally met the criteria 
of vulnerability that were set by the NGO. Widows and their children occupied one 
fourth of the houses. 
 
Building and occupying the sites 
Mayange was built on a piece of land belonging to the Ministry of Youth. A total 
of 400 houses were planned. After the beneficiaries were selected, they started to 
clear the area, and once the plots were allocated they started to make 2,000 mud 
bricks each. FAH provided food for the duration of the brick making. The food 
was partly used as a commodity, giving some people unable to do construction 
work room to contract others to make the bricks. Most beneficiaries commuted as 
regular as they could to the area to work on the site and to make the bricks. In 
January 1996, construction started. Masons of FAH constructed the house. The 
first to finish the bricks, were the first to avail of masons to construct the house. 
Kitchens and latrines had to be built by the beneficiaries; materials for the latter 
were donated by another NGO in the area. In May 1997, after not having been paid 
for five months, the FAH masons left the job, leaving a number of unfinished 
houses behind. Some families were able to complete them on their own, other 
houses weathered away. By the end of 1998, 347 out of the 400 houses were 
completed. Some of the families whose house had not been completed continued to 
live in temporary constructions or in houses of others and tried their best to finish 
their own houses.  
 Occupancy remained initially low in Mayange. As long as the New Case 
refugees had not come back, many preferred to stay in Nyamata (the main village 
centre of Kanzenze commune) or in the other places where they had found temporary 
accommodation. The area of Mayange was, at the start, moreover unattractive: 
looking like a desert and without services. People may also have been reluctant, since 
they knew little about Imidugudu and rumours floated that the settlements were 
dangerous sites, where the poisoning of neighbours was common. One woman 
residing in Kanzenze stated: “I rather die then move to an Imidugudu”.18 Eventually, 
the authorities gave people an occupancy deadline early 1998.  
 Clearing of the Gahembe site started in January 1997, a number of 100 
houses were planned. In this case, the beneficiaries had to cast lots to determine the 
order of being given a house. As in Mayange, people made their own bricks. 
Construction work by ACORD’s masons started in June 1997. The NGO provided 
the materials for the doors, windows, and roofing for houses, kitchens and latrines. 
Occupancy started in April 1998. At that moment 61 houses were finished. 
According to the NGO, they only received funds (from UNHCR) for these houses, 
but they expected money for 39 more. The beneficiaries for those houses had 
already started to make bricks, but by the time of the fieldwork, the funds had not 
yet arrived and construction had not resumed. The adobe bricks that had been 
prepared already had washed away. Some of the intended beneficiaries continued 
                                                 
18
 Interview by Marijn Noordam and Anne-Marie de Beaufort, spring 1998. 
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to live on the site in makeshift houses, others still stayed in the houses they had 
occupied, in cases where the original residents had not (yet) returned from exile. 
 
Services and livelihood 
The houses in Mayange were designed to form blocks of forty houses. Most of 
them had four rows of ten houses each. A certain socio-economic differentiation 
among the occupants was clear from the houses, of which some had metal and 
glass doors, iron bars installed in front of the windows, or built extensions. One 
occupant owned a private grinding machine, another one a lorry. Most people 
depended on agriculture for their subsistence. 
 The services available in the area were a water system, with an irregular 
provision of water, and a health centre of which the logistics were not yet available. 
The water system was provided by an American NGO, the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC). There were outlets at several street corners. The problem was that 
the capacity at the source of the system was insufficient, so most of the times, 
inhabitants had to fetch water from a stream, one hour away from the village. Since 
that water was not clean, however, drinking water was fetched from Nyamata, at one 
and a half hours walking distance from the village. ZOA, a Dutch relief agency with a 
large programme in the region had committed to equip the health centre, but for the 
time being the people had to walk one hour to get health services in a neighbouring 
sector. In this place was also the primary school attended by the children in Mayange 
who thus had to walk approximately six kilometres to get to school. There were 
several small shops in Mayange, and since the beginning of October 1998, there was 
a weekly market. 
 At the end of 1998, Gahembe consisted of four rows of thirteen houses each, 
and one unfinished row of nine houses. Each house had a small addition, for the 
kitchen and the latrine. Gahembe was located on a slope, where before a paysannat 
was created (see above). Gahembe was constructed on an infertile piece of land in the 
middle of this paysannat. More to the East and down to the slope of Gahembe, there 
were houses and fields, neatly outlaid alongside streets running parallel over the 
slope, continuing for about three and a half kilometres. There had been no services 
realised in Gahembe. Water needed to be fetched at a 45 minutes walk, and children 
went to school in another part of the secteur at approximately two kilometres. In both 
sites, Mayange and Gahembe, the lack of drinking water on the site was a major 
source of complaint for the population.  
 There were a couple of small shops in Gahembe, with items like sugar, salt, 
and soap. Only a few people had income outside agriculture (a carpenter, a street 
vendor, a job at the commune, all in Nyamata) and occasionally people did wage-
labour outside the village or labour for fellow-villagers for which they got paid in 
kind. There were no aid programmes of NGOs in the area, and many people related 
about their hardships to make a living.  
 
Land distribution and use 
Mayange was built in an area formerly belonging to the government, which had not 
been under cultivation, except for a few fields. When the families moved into 
Mayange, they first cultivated on plots they had rented or borrowed. In 1997, every 
household was allotted two hectares of land for cultivation. Since the authorities 
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feared that “people will only take the land, but not the house”, land was only allotted 
after people actually had settled in the village. After one year, a survey turned out that 
only one third of the allotted land had been taken into production. At the same time, 
people in the village experienced land shortage. Several explanations were given for 
this paradoxical feature. Lack of rain had made people wait before clearing the land, 
some families had no labour available due to illness or for other reasons, or they 
considered the land too far. The first who had arrived had got the land near to the 
village while others were given land at a distance up to seven kilometres from the 
settlement. One man explained, for example, that he had a field at five kilometres 
away, but preferred to work on a smaller piece of land near the village that he was 
able to borrow. 
 The land distribution alleviated the hardships of life in Mayange. As many 
people related, the first year they had moved to the site, they often went hungry or 
had to survive on cassava leaves. Frequent disease made it even more difficult to 
go out and find some food or work. This situation had considerably improved over 
the years, according to the Mayange residents. 
 In Gahembe, the land situation was more problematic. This site was 
surrounded by an area that before the war already had been used intensively for 
agriculture by families in the paysannat. There was some idle land, which belonged 
to victims of the genocide and refugees that had not (yet) come back. As there were 
no regulations concerning these lands, they were not available for reallocation. As a 
result, only seven families in Gahembe had land of their own. Newcomers had no 
land at all. They borrowed land from people living in the neighbourhood, some for 
free, others paid part of their harvest to the owner. The borrowing arrangements 
concerned usually tiny pieces of land. One household was found borrowing little 
pieces of land of five different owners, on different parts of the slope where the soil 
was suitable for different crops. A dry piece of land was used for peanuts, a more 
humid one for beans and vegetables, and a stony piece of land for cassava. The 
informal arrangement that people in Gahembe had for land, were not long lasting 
and could not resolve the actual land shortage. 
 The Gahembe residents had expected that the local authorities were going to 
provide them with land. Some claimed the authorities had actually promised this. 
Their expectations may also have been raised because they knew that families in 
Mayange had been given land. However, the local authorities so far had not made a 
provision for land. Some government officials acknowledged the problem, others 
stated that it was the responsibility of the residents to find land through informal 
ways. The law stipulated that an occupant of a plot had to vacate the land upon the 
return of the original owner, but included no clause on what the temporary occupant 
had to rely after giving up the land. The Kanzenze authorities had no stand on the 
matter, but waited for a policy for land redistribution from the central government.  
 There was some talk about the possibilities for land redistribution, but this 
was a sensitive issue. The only ‘large’ land holdings in this area that might have been 
subject to distribution belonged to survivors of the genocide, who inherited land from 
their killed relatives. One man in the paysannat, for example, occupied a house by 
himself. Of his extended family of about fifty people (his father, four uncles and their 
families), only seven survived the massacres. They divided the land among 
themselves, and gave some parts to relatives that came back from Uganda. This still 
left him with a relatively large piece of land. It would be very difficult to redistribute 
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these lands, because, as someone said: “This might be explained as a kind of confir-
mation of what the genocidaires intended, and the government does not want to hurt 
the survivors”. Some people interviewed suggested that some of the local authorities 
were opposed to redistribution, in order to protect their own ‘larger’ landholdings. 
 
The issue of cattle 
The issue of cattle raising exacerbated the land shortage. The Old Case returnees to 
the area brought considerable numbers of cows. Before the war, cattle keepers in 
the paysannat kept their cows in the stable and used to have fields for fodder 
production. Grazing was only allowed on locations assigned for this purpose. The 
repatriates introduced free grazing and since there were no new regulations, 
everybody just did as he preferred. After the return of the New Case refugees at the 
end of 1996, it became more difficult for the cattle keepers to find grazing grounds 
on the slope, especially after the construction of the Gahembe site. There was also 
little water in the area. Faced with these problems, a number of large cattle keepers 
left for Gashora and Umutara, areas which were previously relatively empty and 
where a lot of cattle owning Old Case returnees settled. Cattle keepers that 
remained in the Kanzenze area usually only had a few cows, kept alongside other 
agricultural activities. Despite the departure of a lot of the cattle, the unregulated 
grazing of cattle still posed problems. No provisions were made for this at the time 
of the fieldwork, but the authorities were contemplating measures to limit the 
numbers of cows, and considered designating land for grazing purposes. 
 
Beneficiaries as strategizing actors 
The intention of Imidugudu was to provide people with a house where they would 
settle and find a livelihood. Beneficiaries, however, are social actors that use their 
knowledge and capacities to make the best of situations, according to how they 
assess their room for manoeuvre. The question was if and how they would indeed 
settle in Imidugudu. 
 Families that moved to Mayange and Gahembe were in need for a house. 
The experiences at the Mayange site suggested that people might have preferred to 
stay in their temporary residences, but they knew this was not feasible once the 
owners would come back. They needed a house, and Imidugudu was where the 
government wanted them. As someone said: “Everybody is totally free to choose 
where to live as long as it is in the Imidugudu”.  And another: “Imidugudu is the 
policy of the government, so that is where you have to go”. Nevertheless, people in 
Mayange whose houses were not finished by FAH, were actually doing their best to 
finish their houses and many families cemented their houses by their own means. 
This indicated that they were glad to find a house and reckoned to stay for a 
considerable time at least. 
 There were also families who considered their house in the Umudugudu as 
a temporary residency. According to the villagers, Mayange first “looked like a 
desert”. A few families upon completion of their house decided not to occupy it but to 
sell it instead and moved back to Uganda. Cattle holders moved on to other sites in 
Rwanda. There was no explicit regulation concerning ownership of the houses and 
the house lots in the Imidugudu villages, but according to the authorities it was not 
allowed to sell the houses. Informally, transfers took place: 
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A young man told that he sold two houses in Mayange, belonging to his 
uncle and his father, for 50,000 Francs each. After they had been allocated 
a house they decided to return to Uganda. The man, proud of his 
transaction, told that: “Last spring, the commune threatened to give away 
the empty houses if the owners did not occupy them. They put an 
ultimatum of a month, which was prolonged with two weeks, another two 
weeks, and a couple of days. Somebody else then even sold his house for 
5,000 francs only, because he was afraid he would lose it without getting 
anything.” 
 Other families settled in Imidugudu, but planned to move on if possible, at 
some future point in time. Consider, for example, the following case: 
R. was about seventeen years old, when in 1959, he and his parents fled to 
Burundi, leaving the rest of the extended family in Gikongoro. He grew up 
in Bujumbura. When in 1994 the Burundese president Ntaryamira was 
killed, the situation for Rwandese in Burundi became difficult. They had 
to move into camps. In November 1994, R. was able to come back to 
Rwanda, using a transport organised by the new government. He wanted 
to go back to Gikongoro. In Rwanda he learnt that none of his relatives 
had survived the massacres and that Gikongoro was not save. His transport 
left him in Kanzenze commune and, after some days, he was given a house 
of which the owner had fled. When Gahembe site was planned he was 
included among the beneficiaries. When he was busy making adobe bricks 
for the house, the owner of the house he occupied returned. They lived 
together in the house until R’s own house had been finished. He had not 
been given land, so he cultivated then here, then there. In 1998, he found a 
job as watchman in Nyamata, but that only lasted for five months. He had 
to take care of eight children. One of them was a grown up boy of 
marriageable age who needed a house for himself as well. He regarded his 
house as ‘temporarily’, as it was not cemented. If possible, he would still 
put some cement. However, if he had had money, he preferred to go to 
Gikongoro, where he might have been be able to claim some land of his 
deceased relatives. 
Several houses were not occupied by the original beneficiaries. These were 
cases where people had let the house to relatives or other people in more urgent 
need of housing. Land could have been a reason to officially maintain a presence 
in an Umudugudu. A neighbour of an occupant who actually resided in the town 
centre of Nyamata, explained: 
“Even if somebody owns a house in the city, he would keep his house in 
the Umudugudu, because you can only have land when you have a house 
in the Umudugudu”. 
A salaried NGO worker residing in Nyamata related that he had an 
additional house in an Umudugudu that he held on to because of the land. He had 
let the house to tenants. Since he had not been able to find people who wanted to 
move to the settlement, he had to give them part of his land to cultivate before they 
were willing to move in. According to this man, several more people had made 
similar arrangements. These cases tell us, that people indeed try to find their own 
ways to enhance the opportunities of Imidugudu. They also make clear that at this 
point not much can be said yet about the future prospects of the settlements. People 
may consider their residency as less permanent than the authorities expect. 
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Imidugudu entering a new phase 
The above concerned the residents of Mayange and Gahembe, both sites where 
people moved to who were actually in need of a house. Since the end of 1998, 
Imidugudu entered a new phase in Kanzenze. The construction of sites got speeded 
up, and involved increasing numbers of families who already had a house of their 
own. 
 In line with the national policy, the aim of the local authorities in Kanzenze 
commune had always been to eventually regroup the whole population of the 
commune in villages. From the start of the programme, new constructions had only 
been allowed in Imidugudu sites. NGO programmes rehabilitating war-damaged 
houses were stopped, and individuals that built outside of the designated 
settlements were fined. One man we met, in order to circumvent the restriction, 
had started to build a new house during nights, hoping not be found out before the 
house was finished. 
 At first, new houses had to meet certain requirements, such as having a roof 
of iron sheets provided by the community, and using adobe bricks. In October 
1998, the municipal government decided to drop these requirements in order to 
speed up implementation. Until that time, only construction had been started or 
completed in ten sites, but they had planned a total of 105. One responsable 
explained that: 
“The discussion about how construction could be speeded up was 
motivated by the fast approach of January 1999, which was the original 
deadline for everybody in Rwanda living in settlements”. 
 Clearly, national rhetoric about the programme was a serious matter for the 
authorities in Kanzenze, and they were keen to meet this ‘deadline’. From then on, it 
was allowed to construct houses with beams, branches and mud, instead of adobe 
bricks and iron sheets.19 NGOs were no longer asked to build villages, but only to 
provide materials. With the materials, people were expected to construct their own 
houses or houses had to be constructed by communal labour (Umuganda). In 
March 1999, the environment of Kanzenze had changed in a landscape of 
numerous settlements under construction, a skyline of squares of poles, some of 
them covered by a galvanised iron roof, waiting to be covered by mud. 
 With the speeding up of Imidugudu, increasing numbers of families who 
already owned a house were ordered to move. One of the sites we visited was an 
old paysannat, Gitwe. The villagers in Gitwe had stayed in the area since decades. 
Their houses were built in the typical fashion of the paysannat: every family had 
constructed their house near the road, on the strip of two hectares of land allotted 
to them, meaning that the houses were more or less 100 metres apart. They had 
been busy since two months constructing new houses, grouped together on a plot 
which was just about a few hundred metres away from their old house. Most 
families had already put poles and beams, and few trees were left in the area. 
Asked what they thought of the transfer to the Umudugudu, people were mainly 
silent, which we attributed to the presence of the conseiller who had accompanied 
us to the area. 
                                                 
19
 This had especially environmental implications. Houses made with bricks, need around 100 poles 
for the construction. Mud houses, on the other hand, need a complete frame of beams, therefore 
using much more wood.  
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 People were usually resigned in commenting about going to an 
Umudugudu, but small gestures and comments suggested many would prefer to 
stay in their own house. For example, one day a woman was interviewed who 
owned a cemented house and land alongside the main road through the secteur:  
The house had always been the property of her family. She has been 
allocated a plot for construction of a new house in a neighbouring secteur. 
Until that time, nothing had been done and the land was not even cleared 
yet. She would have to build the house by herself: the government would 
only provide material for the roof. She thought, she would be able to keep 
her land, which is close enough to the site to continue cultivating it. Asked 
where she would prefer to live, she only nodded: “in this house”. 
 Other people, presently residing in Nyamata (the major village of Kanzenze 
commune), said they feared losing their social network, or were afraid they could 
not make a living of cultivation on their own. Others welcomed the transfer, 
hoping they would be getting land in the new area. There was no open protest 
against Imidugudu, but some people requested to be exempted. 
A widow living in Nyamata told she did not want to be living in an 
Umudugudu. She did not want to live with people from Uganda, Zaire, 
Burundi and Tanzania, whom she did not know at all. She said that when 
she had been asked to go she had not been interested. She had gone to the 
bourgmestre to explain that she was not able to live in an Umudugudu in 
the countryside, as a single woman with two small children. She could not 
cultivate the land and would not be able to earn her living in another way. 
She had not been forced to move to an Umudugudu. According to a friend 
of hers, the local authorities would not have dared to force her: ”They are 
very careful with survivors. Everybody knows what this woman 
experienced: she lived in Ntarama and her 4 sons have been killed”.  
  Another person also commented that survivors could not be forced: “The 
authorities would not dare to, since some people are mentally not safe. They 
already lost their family. The government knows you have to be patient with 
people here”. This did not apply to all survivors, however. A neighbour of the 
widow quoted above, also a survivor from Ntarama, whose house had remained 
intact, had been told nonetheless to move to an Umudugudu. 
 
Concluding 
The two settlement sites of Mayange and Gahembe were almost fully occupied and 
had alleviated the housing need of the beneficiaries. This does not mean that all 
residents planned to stay settled in the area: some had already moved out, others 
had aspirations to do so in future. In both sites, the installation of services lagged 
behind housing construction, and programmes to enhance economic activity 
outside of agriculture were negligible. In both sites people mainly depended on 
cultivation for their living. This made the issue of land a very crucial one. In 
Gahembe, the non-availability of land was a major problem. People survived 
through informal arrangements to borrow or rent pieces of land, but this was no 
sustainable solution. The land problem was experienced more intense, because 
expectations had been raised that people were to be given a plot.  
 Local people responses to the policy varied according to the interests and 
opportunities they had. For those people who already had a house, the need for 
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land may have been a motivation to look forward to enter an Umudugudu. This 
further underscores the crucial importance for the authorities to address the issue of 
the land. The responses of the Kanzenze authorities to the Imidugudu policy show 
that, in this case, a strict interpretation was followed of the national policy and the 
local government literally aimed to regroup the whole population in the shortest 
possible time span. 
 
 
The case of Gisenyi 
 
Gisenyi secteur, the area of the second case study, was located in the Southeast of 
Kibungo Préfecture. It was about 60 kilometres from Kibungo town, the 
agglomeration with the offices of the Préfecture. Gisenyi could be approached 
from the main road to Tanzania, by a 9 kilometres long sandy track through a 
valley, which reached to the Akagera River in the West, the natural border with 
Tanzania. An in-depth study was conducted in seven out of the ten villages in 
Gisenyi secteur of which construction was initiated by the local authorities, and 
one settlement site, Bukora III, that was implemented close by Gisenyi by a NGO.  
 While Kibungo’s soil was rated ‘average to high’ considering Rwandese 
standards, in Nyarubuye commune soils were poor in certain zones (Préfecture of 
Kibungo, 1998:16-17). Before 1994, the area was relatively empty, apart from a 
series of paysannats, which had been started in1968 for cultivators wishing to 
migrate from densely populated areas, mainly in Ruhengeri. The population was 
predominantly Hutu. In the past, many people from the area had been working in 
Uganda, going forth and back, depending on the tides of civil upheaval over there.  
 Kibungo Préfecture went ahead in the implementation of the Imidugudu 
programme, a trend confirmed by Gisenyi secteur. At the time of fieldwork, 
virtually everybody was living in one of the several villages constructed in the 
secteur. Two issues played an important role in the context of Imidugudu in 
Gisenyi. The area formed part of Nyarubuye commune, which was one of the 
communes that received the highest numbers of returnees in Kibungo. Compared to 
population numbers of January 1994 it saw its number of inhabitants doubled 
(Préfecture of Kibungo, 1998:iii, 19). Immediately after the war, huge numbers of 
Old Case returnees had settled in the area. The return of the New Case returnees, 
some time later, resulted in a large need for houses and land. According to the 
conseiller of Gisenyi, the enormous increase in population was the reason why the 
local authorities decided to redistribute the land and to concentrate the population 
in villages, in order to make land available. 
 Another backdrop to the resettlement operation in Gisenyi was the security 
situation. After the influx of the refugees from the camps in Tanzania, the area 
remained unsafe for a long time as a result of infiltration by Interahamwe crossing 
the border river from Tanzania. Spring 1998, for example, witnessed an attack on 
an LWF (Lutheran World Federation) settlement site, in which eight people lost 
their lives. Some people in the area had been accused of collaboration, others were 
simply forced to collaborate. There were unconfirmed rumours about retaliations 
by the army. Some New Case returnees had disappeared from the area, who may 
have crossed back over the border to Tanzania. The situation remained tense for a 
long time and it was in such a volatile context that resettlement was implemented.  
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Imidugudu actors: local government and NGOs  
“No policy in Kibungo features so important as villagisation. Kibungo is at the heart 
of the national villagisation campaign” (Préfecture of Kibungo, Feb-1998: 22). 
During war and genocide, the largest part of the population of Kibungo Préfecture 
fled the country. Of the estimated 600,000 people only 200,000 remained. Compared 
to the rest of the country, Kibungo received a disproportional share of returnees: 
519,000 between 1994 en 1997 (of which 109,000 were Old Case and 410,000 were 
New Case returnees). Most people entered at the end of 1996, coming from Tanzania.  
In the year 1996, large-scale housing programmes were started and by mid-
1997, construction was in progress at some 40 villagisation sites. In many 
communes, the local authorities told the population to regroup in villages or along 
the main roadsides. Rehabilitation of houses that had been damaged during the war 
was halted, and the construction of houses outside village sites strongly 
discouraged. It was estimated that in the beginning of 1999, more than 80% of 
Kibungo’s population lived in villages. Compared to other Préfectures, Kibungo 
was densely populated with NGOs and many contributed to the villagisation 
programme. Nevertheless, comparatively speaking, their contribution was small. 
Only a tiny fraction of all houses constructed in the Préfecture was built by NGOs. 
The local authorities took the lead in construction. The former Préfet of Kibungo 
was praised for his exemplary efforts to implement the programme and was 
promoted to the same post in Kigali-ville. 
 In Gisenyi, since January 1997, ten settlement sites of about 150 houses 
each were constructed in the secteur. Most construction was done by the 
population itself. The local authorities, in the person of the conseiller, indicated the 
locations for the villages and set the date for moving. The conseiller himself was 
an Old Case returnee. He and the responsables (of whom some are Old Case and 
others are New Case returnees) allocated the plots to the individual families. The 
local authorities were responsible for the distribution of roofing material provided 
by UNHCR. 
 Two NGOs, Red Barnet and CARITAS, contributed in the construction of 
a few houses for vulnerable groups. Red Barnet, a Danish NGO, focused its acti-
vities on children. It started a project in 1997 to construct 135 houses for orphans 
in the commune of Nyarubuye. Forty of these houses were located in Gisenyi. The 
local division of CARITAS, mobilized thirty families of the Catholic parish to 
build five houses for widows. CARITAS provided material and skilled labour.  
 In an area adjacent to Gisenyi,20 a settlement site was under construction by 
LWF (Lutheran World Federation), Bukora III. LWF was one of the major NGOs 
in Rwanda. Since 1995 it ran emergency programmes in Kibungo and since 1996 it 
had been heavily involved in settlement building programmes. The NGO was 
involved in the construction of four large settlement sites, of 350 to 500 houses in 
three communes, and additional smaller clusters of houses in other communes. In 
the larger settlement sites LWF installed a water system or catchment and primary 
schools. Social mobilisers resided permanently in the sites to give support to 
associations and small enterprises. Bukora III, in the Gisenyi area, was partially 
inhabited by people originating from Gisenyi and partially by Old Case returnees.   
                                                 
20
 Before the massive population influx, this area formed part of Gisenyi secteur, but by now it has 
become an administrative unit in itself. 
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Beneficiaries and selection 
The Imidugudu policy as applied in Kibungo stipulated that everybody had to 
move to a settlement. In Gisenyi itself, a large part of the population moved to one 
of the self-built settlements, and a smaller part went to NGO sites implemented 
outside the secteur. In this case, the question is not who was an Imidugudu 
beneficiary, everybody was, but who moved to which kind of site?  
Since everybody had to move to a new settlement, the authorities did not 
bother much to ensure that New Case returnees could reclaim their houses. The 
rule that Old Case returnees had to vacate the houses when the owners returned 
was not enforced strictly, as it was expected that all were going to move to other 
locations. In practice, this meant that in most cases, the New Case returnees 
temporarily had to reside in makeshift accommodations. Those people that could 
not build their own house in an Umudugudu could avail of the option to move to an 
NGO site. 
In the majority of cases, however, the decisive factor was the availability of 
land. Some Old Case returnees had not been able to get access to land, as well as a 
number of New Case returnees. Already prior to the war, land suitable for 
cultivation was not abundant and some of the original inhabitants had been 
occupying low quality land while others had always been land-less.   
 The people that moved because they could not access land or were 
incapable to construct their own houses found in the NGO sites an opportunity to 
ensure these basic necessities. However, in other cases the need to move was not 
obvious and more disputed. One controversial case was formed by those families 
who lost land, because it was designated for Imidugudu sites. These people 
claimed that the authorities had forced them to move away to an NGO site. 
Another case (to be discussed below) concerned people that lost their land to 
military officers. Nonetheless, most people that had moved to NGO sites had 
apparently done so voluntarily.  
 Not everybody that left Gisenyi went to live in an NGO site. A number of 
Old Case returnees experienced so many difficulties in this unfamiliar area 
(diseases, difficulties with keeping cattle) that they decided to return to their 
former place of exile. Some New Case returnees left with unknown destination. 
At the start of the Imidugudu, few people seemed eager to move to an NGO 
site. In the opinion of Gisenyi residents, conditions in the villages were difficult, as 
cultivation had to start from zero. Moving to NGO-implemented sites in first 
instance appeared a desperate strategy. In the course of time, people realised, 
however, that the situation changed and started to see some advantages. They 
referred to the fact that people got a house, that there were a lot of services in the 
NGO villages and that distributed plots were larger in size than was usual in 
Gisenyi itself. Nevertheless, given a choice, people usually preferred to stay on 
their own land. A major problem of the NGO sites remained that these were 
constructed near relatively infertile soils. A social mobiliser in Bukora III said, that 
the services probably never could outweigh the disadvantage that the quality of the 
land allocated to the villagers was very low. 
 
Building and occupying the sites   
In Gisenyi secteur, ten settlement sites of about 150 houses each were constructed.  
Building activities purposefully took place in agriculturally less valued areas of the 
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secteur. The first self-build settlement site in Gisenyi provided a place to live to 
Old Case returnees coming from the whole secteur. The allocation of plots for the 
houses was well co-ordinated, and the houses were built in neat rows of ten. 
Thereafter, the process went faster and faster. Resettlement got a boost in the 
summer of 1997, when the authorities started total regrouping. In three months 
time the entire population moved to the location of the future sites. People living in 
specific areas of the secteur, moved together to the specified locations for new 
sites. The composition of these settlement sites thus resembled the composition of 
the Gisenyi population before moving. A number of sites consisted of mixed Old 
and New Case returnees, some were predominantly inhabited by either New or Old 
Case returnees. Some sites were erected in old settlements. In these places, the 
allocation of plots was less co-ordinated. This resulted in a less delineated building 
pattern: bending roads and substantial differences in size and quality of the houses. 
 The self-build houses in Gisenyi were constructed of wooden beams and 
branches covered with mud, in an improvised way. Some people were able to use 
materials of their former houses in the paysannats. These abandoned houses were 
all destroyed or taken apart by their former owners. People were allowed to cut 
trees freely, to avail of beams. This resulted in considerable deforestation of the 
hill slopes surrounding the villages. The only support available for the construction 
of the houses was roofing material, which was provided by the UNHCR. In 
principle, everybody was entitled to a roof, but the quantity available did not 
suffice for the entire population. In order to prevent embezzlement, the authorities 
stipulated that roofing was not given until a house was finished. Although this 
ensured a rather orderly process, the disadvantage was that those people who could 
not finish their house quickly in the end had no roofing. Unfortunately, these were 
usually the so-called vulnerable people, such as orphans who availed of little 
labour assistance in constructing a house. 
 
Services and livelihoods 
Before the war, there used to be one tap for drinking water in Gisenyi. In the 
beginning of 1999, IRC (the American NGO which we already met in the case of 
Kanzenze) was finishing the rehabilitation of a pre-war water tank, the 
construction of a new tank on the hill above the villages and the installation of 
several taps throughout the different sites. As a result, the situation of drinking 
water improved considerably. 
 There were a primary and a secondary school in the secteur. The veterinary 
dispensary and agricultural extension, which were present in the secteur before the 
war, have not reappeared. A health centre was situated at a distance of about six 
kilometres from the sites. Many people remarked that the absence of a dispensary 
was at least inconvenient. They also remarked that there was no real commercial 
centre.  
 Agriculture was the main occupation of the inhabitants of Gisenyi secteur. 
Agricultural production was mainly subsistence farming, although sorghum was 
grown as a cash crop. In several sites (women) associations were formed that 
produced sorghum for the national brewing company, BRALIRWA. The company 
provided the specific seeds for the sorghum, and the produce was sold to a co-
operative which delivered the sorghum to the brewery. Apart from agricultural 
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wage labour, few other paid jobs could be found in the village. NGOs irregularly 
employed wage labourers for construction work. There were a few craftsman 
workshops, but as a result of the isolated location of the village it was hard to get 
materials for craft work. 
 Although in principle most people had access to at least one hectare of 
agricultural land, many people were referring to the difficulties they experienced in 
agricultural production. The problem was neither the size of the plots, nor soil 
infertility. People assured us that one hectare of land in the area was enough as the 
soil was fertile. Fertility had even increased as a result of war as the land had been 
lying fallow. However, it was difficult to start anew and many people said they did 
not finish cultivating the whole of their land yet. 
A farmer told, that after three years of absence his land had become a 
wilderness again and all the weeds made cultivation difficult. “It is like 
starting anew”, he said. For the moment, he did not consider renting land, 
as he still had enough work on his own land. 
The displacement from the land for cultivation was regarded by many as a 
major disadvantage of the resettlement process. People generally explained it as a 
disadvantage to be living off their fields. People said that when living on the land, 
more work could be done on it and more could be harvested. It had become a lot of 
work to bring the harvest back home and to bring manure to the fields and the 
fields could not be watched for theft or harm by wild animals (see also Gilad, 
forthcoming).  
 
Land distribution and use 
The Préfecture of Kibungo, including Gisenyi, was the first one to start procedures 
for land redistribution in favour of the land-less (Préfecture of Kibungo, 1998:19). 
Before the war, most of the fertile land in the area was in cultivation. Most people 
were living in the paysannat, where they availed of two hectares of land each. 
After the war, the minimum amount of land that had to be available to a family 
was set at one hectare. This meant that sharing arrangements were made between 
New Case returnees and the Old Case repatriates occupying the land. Some Old 
Case returnees who were not able to find a partner to share land had to leave. The 
same for those Old Case returnees that were sharing plots among themselves, prior 
to the return of the owners of the property. New Case returnees who lost their land 
were not entitled to share with other New Case returnees. Consider the following 
case of a New Case returnee: 
A woman living in Bukora III who originated from Gisenyi told that her 
husband had two wives. Before the war the two households shared his 
two-hectare plot in the paysannat. After return they had to offer one 
hectare to an Old Case returnee and the remainder was too small for the 
two families, so one had to quit.  
Two issues regarding land distribution were locally controversial. The first 
concerned those people whose land was used for Imidugudu settlements. The 
second concerned a fertile floodplain South of the Gisenyi sites. After the war, this 
floodplain became a military zone and the former inhabitants were not allowed to 
return, and had to move to an NGO settlement. According to people in Gisenyi, the 
area may have been a military zone for some time, but by now it had been 
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distributed to a number of military officers. These used the land for cultivation of 
sorghum (a highly valued cash crop in the area). Arrangements for tenancy were 
made with the local population, and some people found employment as wage 
labourers on the estates of the military. The idea that the land had not been 
returned to the former ‘owners’ but given to military instead, that moreover resided 
in other areas, was a source of resentment.  
 Despite the scarcity of land, some people were able to expand the amount 
of land available to them for cultivation. Part of the land in hands of the military 
was leased to the local population. In some areas land for cultivation could be 
rented or borrowed, although this was officially forbidden. Renting out of a few 
parcels could result from distress or money needed for emergency situations, or 
from the simple fact that the owners were not able to cultivate themselves (e.g. old 
widows). Consider the following account, for example: 
Apart from the land in a former paysannat, a New Case returnee tried to 
grow potatoes in the marshland North of the Gisenyi sites. He rented the 
land of people who got their land allocated over there. As in the rainy 
season there was too much water in the marshland, it could only be 
cultivated in the dry season. “The people who got their hectare over there 
are not lucky in the rainy season, but a little bit in the dry season”, he said. 
Therefore, in the dry season the people tried to rent land somewhere else. 
“People from other areas like to cultivate in the marshland as you can 
grow potatoes over there, which give a lot of money in the market. 
However, you need some money to make some system for drainage”. The 
person himself rented out part of his land in order to be able to rent land in 
the marshland. Not all the land in the marshland had been allocated, a part 
was left for associations but as they were not there it was freely available 
to everybody. However, all that land was taken into use already by other 
individuals, therefore he had to rent. 
 Due to the departure of people to NGO sites outside the area or elsewhere, 
everybody in Gisenyi had access to land. Nevertheless, it was questionable 
whether this would remain so in the near future. Even the one-hectare policy would 
not solve the land shortage in the area. Although some land was still available, 
many people talked about the difficulty to find land for their children. Moreover, 
land could not be left as heritage as it was the commune who decides about allo-
cation. It was unclear how the local authorities were going to face these issues.  
A widow, living in her house from before the war in Gisenyi, owned one 
hectare. Both her sons were married but to one of them no land had been 
allocated, as he had constructed his house and married only after the 
allocation in 1997. She had asked the conseiller already for land, but he 
had told her that there was nothing available. For the time being, her son 
cultivated on a plot in the marshland, owned by the military, and borrowed 
a part of the land of his mother. The woman did not know if she could 
leave the land for her sons to inherit: “it is the government who is the 
owner and who will have to decide” 
 
The issue of cattle 
No specific arrangements had been made for cattle. Before the war, there were 
hardly any cows in the area. Since the influx of Old Case returnees, this situation 
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changed considerably. Most cattle keepers brought their flock from Burundi and 
Tanzania, only a few left their cows behind. No land was reserved for grazing. 
Cattle keepers started to herd their cows in fields that were lying fallow, but the 
absence of formal arrangements posed a serious problem later on. The local 
authorities were considering an education campaign to convince farmers to breed 
special cows that can be kept at home and fed with fodder.  
 
Beneficiaries as strategizing actors 
Confronted by the Imidugudu programme, returnees explore their room for 
manoeuvre and strategize whether and how they will act. In the foregoing we have 
seen that the Gisenyi secteur had to face an immense number of returnees, a 
resulting land shortage, and a serious security problem. How did the returnees 
interpret the situation and how did they situate Imidugudu in their livelihoods? The 
following case shows how moving to an Umudugudu was shaped by local 
interpretations and strategies:   
When P., a New Case returnee, and his family returned from Tanzania in 
the end of 1996, they found their house in the paysannat occupied by an 
Old Case returnee and his family. The occupant refused to move out, so P. 
and his family were lodged temporarily in a make shift village, close by. 
P. explained to us: “The authorities did not let us return to our old houses, 
to prevent problems between originals and repatriates”. P. used to have a 
good banana plantation on fertile ground but the occupant was not willing 
to share the harvest. According to P., the problem was not in the first place 
with the occupants, but with the local authorities: “The conseiller, also an 
Old Case returnee, was occupying a house himself in the same paysannat. 
It was him who decided that the Old Case returnees could stay and that the 
New Case returnees had to be lodged somewhere else, for the time being. 
It was in the whole secteur that the originals were not allowed to return to 
their old houses”.  
In the summer of 1997, both Old and New Case returnees had to 
move to the area where the new site was to be constructed. When they 
moved they took their make shift accommodations with them. This 
movement happened within a period of one week only. According to P. 
the contents of his house (furniture, kitchen equipment) was taken away 
by the occupying Old Case returnee. This happened during the night, to 
prevent somebody from seeing it: “It was common that the repatriates 
took the contents of the house. They just told they had found the house 
empty. This was also the reason that the originals were not allowed to re-
enter their houses”. The occupant had told him: I am not your guardian, 
you were not there. Despite the problem regarding the contents of the 
house, the relation between P. and the occupant family evolved without 
problems and actually they were sharing the land without any difficulties.  
When everybody moved to an Umudugudu, P. removed the roof, 
doors and windows of his house. He re-used the materials for construction 
of a kitchen and toilet next to his new house in the settlement site. He 
received a roofing kit from UNHCR. When living in the make shift 
accommodation, they had given his family some pans, dishes and blankets 
already. It took P. and his family until November before the house was 
finished. After moving to the newly constructed site the land was 
redistributed. “Until that moment we were not allowed to work on the land 
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and we survived with food aid given by UNHCR”.  
Discussing his present living situation, P. told that his problem 
was that his land was very far away. “The paysannat was comparable to a 
village: over there we had good houses, however. We were close to our 
land. The houses over here are bad and our bananas are stolen from the 
field. The roofs we got are not sustainable”. If he would be told that he 
could return to his old house he would return immediately, even if he 
would have to live in a miserable house, he said. “It is my land only which 
makes my living”, he explained, “If an old woman is sick she might not be 
able to reach her land, while there is food in it”. According to him, 
relationships between people did not change as a result of living in the 
village: “in the paysannat people also lived a little bit together. It is only 
the law that says that we have to live together. In Rusumo [an adjacent 
commune] and further to the north, people were allowed to stay in their 
old house. My old house was close to a road, but it had to be destroyed”. 
According to P. the difference was made by the personalities of the 
different conseillers. It was the conseiller who decided that the people had 
to move. For security reasons, military were staying in the area, with the 
conseiller in charge. The people were afraid and felt they could not refuse, 
P. said. “I have no hope for the future that I will be able to return”. 
 The case of P. shows us a man who did what had to be done and tried to 
make the best of the situation he found himself in. It was also obvious that he had 
his own ideas and interpretations about the resettlement. He did not see the need to 
move away from the road and his land, and he resented living away from his fields. 
Many New Case returnees displayed similar sentiments. Old Case returnees were 
quite neutral about what the programme changed in their situation. Many of them 
were happy to have found a house and land. For some New Case returnees, 
resettlement also meant an improvement. However, a number of New Case 
returnees, such as P., experienced a sense of loss and felt their situation had 
deteriorated because of the resettlement. These people did not understand why 
their move had to be permanent, instead of a temporary measure until the security 
situation had improved. Quite a few people assured us, that if there were a 
possibility, many people would return to their old houses. As somebody said: 
 “For the people in the paysannat, Imidugudu was absolutely not 
necessary”, a man in one of the seven sites in Gisenyi told. If his former 
house had been far away in the hills, he would have accepted that he had 
had to move. “When the paysannat were started, it was said that it was 
good for development to live close to the road. Before the war, people in 
the hills were already told to move to the road”.  
 These New Case returnees had moreover a strong sense of political 
deprivation. They felt that the Imidugudu programme, as it was implemented in 
Gisenyi, was meant to serve the interests of ‘others’, i.e. the Old Case returnees. 
The remark that “power is with the repatriates”, expressed this feeling very well. 
At first site, these sentiments seemed to hint at a generalised ethnic tension. This 
was, among others, apparent in the derogatory labels people used for Old Case 
returnees. However, the case of P. and other interviewees told us the issue was 
more complicated. The resentment of New Case returnees was not directed to 
those Old Case repatriates with whom they had to share their land, or even in the 
case of P. who took their house utensils. In fact, remarkably few stories circulated 
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about problems between cultivators sharing land. Complaints and resentment were 
directed to officials. The case of P. shows that his major problem was not with the 
family he shared the land with, but with the conseiller, who to his mind had treated 
him badly and only served his own interests. In a similar vein, people complained 
about the military officers that had taken the land. 
It turns out that the more problematic relation was not simply between 
people from a different ethnic background, but was concentrated in the interface of 
cultivators and authorities. This interface contained indeed an ethnic dimension. It 
concerned the sense of deprivation of New Case returnees by mainly Old Case 
authorities. However, the incidents leading to this sense of deprivation originated 
with the treatment that ordinary cultivators perceived from authorities. Problems at 
the interface between cultivators and authorities also became manifest in the 
difficulties authorities had with the population. Due to security problems, there 
was a lot of suspicion that people had been supportive of Interahamwe. In such an 
environment, a policy like Imidugudu was likely to be interpreted as another 
instance of political deprivation. 
 
Concluding 
In certain respects, Gisenyi secteur was maybe quite an exceptional case. The 
extraordinary huge amounts of returnees, the security problems and specific politi-
cal climate put a particular stamp on the developments in the area. Nevertheless, 
some observations can be distilled from the previous story, which have a relevance 
beyond this specific case. 
 Like in Kanzenze, it appears that the problematic issue of land is not fully 
addressed by the Imidugudu programme. For the time being it might be adequate, 
but problems similar to those in the past threaten in the future. The same goes for 
cattle. 
 Again we have seen that the extent to which the programme is actually 
implemented depends largely on the efforts and persistence of the local authorities. 
They presented and continue to present Imidugudu as a necessity for development 
and security. Nevertheless, although people accepted the rationale of security in the 
past, they no longer see the grounds for living far away from their lands with the 
improvement of the security situation. Some even plan to return back to their 
previous accommodations in the future if possible. 
 One important finding from this case is that people tend to interpret the 
programme in political and ethnical terms and this has consequences for their 
intentions, strategies and everyday practises. This does not tell us much about the 
‘real’ properties of the Imidugudu policy. The policy may be based on equity, or non-
discrimination, the point is that ordinary people perceive it differently. This finding 
should be taken serious. People’s perceptions are important, because they determine 
their responses. Besides, looking at the incidents that trigger these ethnically coloured 
perceptions, it may be important to evaluate and possibly improve the interface 
between authorities and cultivators. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
When we talked to officers in Kigali, after we had completed the fieldwork, the 
first question often was: “And, what have you found, are you in favour or against 
Imidugudu?” Our answer was never a simple yes or no. As we noticed, Imidugudu 
gets interpreted by different actors, and evokes different responses. Besides, there 
is a large diversity in the conditions in the regions and localities where it is 
implemented. As a result, Imidugudu evolves in different ways. In some areas it 
works well, in others it does not. Our major question was: why, given these 
diversities, a blueprint solution was adopted for the settlement problem? Can 
regrouping of the rural population in Imidugudu settlements be a single solution for 
the entire countryside? We believe not. Eventually, what is needed is a case-to-
case approach where policies for settlement get integrated with approaches for land 
distribution and land use, services and livelihoods.  
 Imidugudu was meant to address the housing problem, to alleviate the 
security situation, to contribute to reconciliation and to lead to better land use. 
Although we can not assess the impact of Imidugudu for the whole country, let us 
briefly review these objectives for the two cases we studied, taking into account 
the conditions and practices of implementation, and the responses of the actors 
involved. 
 It is clear that Imidugudu has substantially contributed to solve the housing 
problem. Although we have not assessed Imidugudu in the light of technical 
aspects of construction, and although we reiterate that the provision of houses does 
not have to imply per se the formation of standardised settlements, a fact is that 
many families have received a house through the programme. There is appreciation 
for the houses of those who were homeless. More problematic is the policy where 
it concerns people who had to abandon their own house in order to rebuild a house 
in an Umudugudu. Whether people appreciate living in a settlement instead of 
having dispersed houses seems to vary and is difficult to assess. A number of 
people have left, such as Old Case repatriates who decided to go back to their 
former country of exile. Some others hope for an opportunity to move elsewhere, 
or to eventually move back to their fields. The non-delivery of services that were 
promised in order to entice people to move to the settlements is an important factor 
in people’s appreciation of the Umudugudu. 
  According to the Rwanda government, the security situation necessitated 
the concentration of the population in settlements. In the case of Kibungo, the 
security situation was indeed an important factor in the establishment of settlement 
sites. In the case of Kanzenze, security did not play a significant role, except in the 
discourse of the local authorities to explain the policy in line with the national 
rhetoric. Security considerations thus vary in different areas of the country and it 
can be expected that if the security situation in an area improves, the local 
population no longer sees it as a rationale for staying in the villages and would like 
to go back to their former residences.   
 The aspect of reconciliation depends very much on the particular situation 
in the localities. In our case studies it was more prominent in the case of Gisenyi. 
This area used to be a predominantly Hutu area. After the war, its population 
doubled when a large number of Tutsi repatriates settled in this area. Land had to 
be shared between the ‘originals’ as they called themselves and the repatriates. 
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Since houses could not be shared, the decision that everybody had to move 
represented a certain equity, a kind of judgement of Solomon, in which nobody 
was favoured with the entitlement of the old houses, and everybody was equally 
burdened by the hassles of constructing and moving places. On the other hand, 
there was much resentment about alleged diversions from this general guideline, 
and many of the Hutu population perceived of the policy as a means to deprive and 
control them. 
 In this respect, it has to be remembered that ethnicity is not the only source 
of social tension. One particular question we want to address is the top-down 
property of the policy. Rwanda is a country, where top-down development has 
been adamant and may even be blamed for contributing to past atrocities, 
considering the organisation of the genocide and other outbreaks of ethnic 
cleansing. Relentless adoption of this top-down policy regime by local authorities 
may lead to a ruthless pursuing of national policies. This is exemplified by the case 
of Kanzenze commune, where the local authorities take the ‘deadline’ for the 
complete regrouping of the population as a very serious matter, resulting in the 
hasty implementation of a complete transformation of the rural landscape. The 
compulsory nature of the policy breeds resentment, that finds no expression in 
open political protest but nonetheless may contribute to long term social tension. A 
possible bias of the urban-based political elite against the rural population may 
exacerbate this tension. 
 A central rationale of the Imidugudu policy is its belief in planning for a 
more scientific approach to settlement and land use. This remains problematic. Our 
case studies were conducted in areas where the land pressure is less than the 
average for the country. Nevertheless, the availability of land was a problem, in 
some of the settlements land is scarce. People feel insecure about their 
entitlements, given that the land question is not resolved. Furthermore, people 
report that living away from the fields hampers agricultural activities. The effect 
for the yields may have to be established through further research. The case studies 
make clear that Imidugudu so far has not been implemented in the integrated way it 
was envisaged. Houses have been built, but these have not been accompanied by 
substantive measures addressing land, cattle and other livelihood resources.  
 
The case of Imidugudu confirms the recent finding that when refugees come home 
this is the start of a long process of reintegration and development, rather than an 
end-good-all-good closure of a period of exile. The housing problem is being 
addressed, but other pressing problems remain before the use of land can be 
improved and livelihood ensured. There are presently hundreds of Imidugudu 
settlements in Rwanda. The challenge for the near future is to improve life and 
livelihoods in these settlements. Given the variety in local conditions, an integrated 
case-to-case approach is called for.  
 This also means, to our mind, that a settlement policy should be developed 
with more flexibility to respond to local diversity as well as to future habitation 
needs. Present policies focus on Imidugudu as a standardised settlement pattern for 
the whole country, except for those areas that have already been urbanised. 
Considering that local people in search for their livelihood might see their 
residence in an Umudugudu as a temporary affair, and considering the pressure on 
the settlements that will be posed by the next generation, it seems important to 
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have a more flexible policy that incorporates a certain freedom of migration and 
settlement as well as the possible growth of urban areas.  
 The third chapter ended with a note of caution regarding ‘emergency 
development’, i.e. those cases where under pressure of an emergency, programmes 
are started with far-stretching consequences for future development. Certain 
conditions are not met in these situations, such as thorough research, feasibility 
studies and the exploration of alternatives. Besides, as we contended, following 
Roe (1991), a result of these situations is that policy makers and programme 
officers, in order to address the magnitude of ambiguities involved, tend to resort 
to blueprint solutions.  
 Our findings in Kanzenze and Kibungo confirm the caution against 
emergency development. Without claiming that Imidugudu should not have been 
done, we do contend that an integrated application on a case-to-case basis would 
lead to better results. In the same vein, we caution against blueprint solutions for 
the problem that now pressures policy makers in Rwanda, namely the issue of the 
land. Although indeed the land question seems urgent, blueprint solutions may not 
be the answer. This is especially so, considering the vast variety in informal 
arrangements and practices that surround access to land and practices of land use. 
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